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The Implications of the Economic
Concept of Income for Corporation-
Shareholder Income Tax Systems
Leon Gabinet*
Ronald J. Coffey**
Recent discussions of tax reform have included suggestions for the abolition of
the corporate income tax and the attribution of corporate income to the share-
holders. Restricting acceptance of these suggestions is the holding of Eisner v.
Macomber, which not only adopted a tax theology based upon the separate status of
corporations and shareholders but also required the realization of income prior to
recognition. The authors demonstrate the implications of an economic concept of
income by showing the relationship of a firm's economic income to the economic
income of the firm's individual owners. One implication of their analysis is that a
tax at the corporate level is unnecessary, because the economic income of share-
holders includes the income-period wealth effect changes associated with firm own-
ership. The authors suggest that Macomber and subsequent cases may most favor
an integration of the corporation-shareholder tax system that abolishes the
corporate-level tax and computes the shareholder's income on an economic income
basis. On the other hand, it is concluded that Supreme Court authority still
cuts strongly against integration systems that simply include a pro rata share of
corporate earnings in shareholder income, and that these latter forms of integration
are at odds with an economic income analysis as well.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE SYSTEM OF federal income taxation of corporations and share-holders has been characterized as one of the most controversial ele-
ments of the American tax system. 1  As evidenced by its preeminence on
the agendas of tax institutes and conferences, it is at least one of the most
frequently debated aspects of the tax system. 2 In recent months it has gen-
erated renewed interest not only as an object of general tax reform but also
as a factor relating to the recent woes of our financial markets. Some com-
mentators have favored the complete abolition of the tax on corporate "in-
* B.A. (1950), University of Chicago; J.D. (1953), University of Chicago. The co-author is
professor of law at Case Western Reserve University. He is admitted to the Ohio and Oregon
Bars.
** A.B. -(1958), Xavier University; LL.B. (1961), University of Cincinnati; LL.M. (1966),
Harvard Law School. The co-author is professor of law at Case Western Reserve University. He
is admitted to the Ohio Bar.
1. See, e.g., L. KIMMEL, TAXES AND ECONOMIC INCENnVES 17 (1950).
2. See, e.g., The Taxation of Income From Corporate Shareholding, 28 NA'L TAX J. 255
(1975), containing a symposium sponsored by the National Tax Association and the Tax Institute
of America and held in Washington, D.C., on July 9-10, 1975.
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come" (as that value is calculated in tax law today) and the attribution of all
such income pro rata to the shareholders. 3 Others have suggested less ex-
treme approaches, 4 including a drastic reduction in the corporate tax rate, 5 a
tax credit to shareholders for corporate income taxes paid, 6 and a deduction
from corporate income for dividend distributions. 7
Our purpose in this article is to consider two major issues which neces-
sarily arise in connection with any scheme for the abolition of the corporate
income tax or the integration of the double-level system. First, there is the
question whether some form of undistributed "income" (not necessarily as
that value is calculated for tax purposes today) of a corporation can be attri-
buted and taxed to its indirect owners, the equity holders. Second, there is
the question of the extent to which distributions from a firm to its owners
should be subjected to taxation simply because they have been severed from
the firm's asset pool. Underlying our discussion of these issues is the as-
sumption that sound income tax policy may require the imposition of a tax
on all or some part of "income," as that term is generally understood by
economists, but that nothing other than economic income should be sub-
jected to tax. 8  Accordingly, we shall attempt to develop a theoretical
framework involving the concept of the economic income of a corporation
and relating that concept to the economic income of the owners of the cor-
poration, both with respect to the timing of income and the manner of com-
puting the income to be taxed. The object of such an analysis is to provide a
basis for resolving the two major issues which we see as central to any plan
for the integration of the corporate and individual income taxes.
3. See Eisner, A Hard Look at Corporate Taxes, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1974, at 18:
4. These intermediate measures will achieve the same types of results anticipated from a
complete abolition of the corporate income tax, but to different degrees and with varying effects
on the so-called neutrality and equity objectives of taxation. See generally McLure, Integration
of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Pro-
posals, 88 HARv. L. Rlv. 532, 549-61 (1975).
5. See 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission Report),
ch. 19, at 83 (1966).
6. See L. KIMMEL, supra note 1, at 110.
7. See Cohen, Possible Solutions to Practical Problems in Integration of the Corporate and
Shareholder Income Tax, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 367 (1975).
8. See topic IV. A. infra. Although this fiscal attitude is not (with some implicit exceptions)
currently popular in the context of corporate-source income, its plausibility has, perhaps, been
attenuated in some ways by Supreme Court interpretations and fears of impracticability. In
noncorporate-source income settings, on the other hand, economic income (subject to realiza-
tion requirements) seems to enjoy theoretical primacy. See G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
TAX REFORM 5-6 (1975). This article presumes a policy preference for the use of economic
income as the tax base in-corporate-source systems, though portions of the discussion also offer
substantive support for that view.
To some extent, we do adopt a tax "theology," but only tentatively. See Surrey, Reflections
on "Integration" of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335 (1975). It
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No discussion of our present system of taxing corporate income and no
discussion of the revision of that system can avoid a consideration of the
landmark case of Eisner v. Macomber.9 Despite the protestations of many
commentators that Macomber has lost its early vitality, 10 it remains the most
important statement of the Supreme Court on the relationship between the
income of a corporation and the income of its shareholders. Moreover, since
the decision was based on an interpretation of the word "income" in the
sixteenth amendment, it raises important constitutional limitations with re-
spect to the taxation of corporations and shareholders. Therefore, our discus-
sion will focus on a comparison of the results which Macomber appears to
require with those arising from an economic view of income and the relation
between the economic income of corporations and their shareholders.
Finally, we shall review various plans or systems for the integration of the
individual and corporate income taxes with respect to their conformity with
the concept of economic income and their relation to the Macomber view of
the corporation-shareholder relationship. This discussion will include an
analysis of our present double-level system of taxation, proposals for integra-
tion at the shareholder level, such as the credit system, and proposals for
integration at the corporate level, notably the split-rate system and the de-
duction for dividend distributions.
II. THE HIsTOmcAL BACKGROUND
AND BUDGETARY INERTIA
Our current system of corporate taxation, which imposes rates of 20%
and 22% on the first and second $25,000 increments of taxable income, re-
spectively, and a rate of 48% on all corporate net income in excess of
$50,000,11 may be traced back to 1909.12 With the enactment of the Re-
should be understood, however, that we are fundamentally discussing the implications of the
economic concept of income on various taxing systems, if a primacy for economic income as the
tax base is accepted.
We hope that our analysis might aid the thought processes of those who must determine
whether the concept of economic income should be given strong normative significance in
systems of corporation-shareholder taxation. At any rate, as a matter of interpretation, the word
"income," as applied to the corporation-shareholder system, need not conjure economic con-
cepts any less easily than alternative notions.
9. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
10. See, e.g., B. BITTER & J. EusTscE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION OF COmPOrATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-5 n.7 (1971); Cohen, Taxing Stock Dividends and Economic Theory,
1974 Wis. L. REv. 142, 147 n. 19; Loundes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 Oio
ST. L.J. 151 (1964). But cf Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 625 n.8, 627, 632-34
(1975).
11. I.R.C. § 11(a)-(d).
12. Rev. Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, which imposed a one percent surcharge on
net corporate income in excess of $5,00o.
1977]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
venue Act of 1913,13 dividend distributions were included in the gross in-
come of shareholders, thereby establishing the "double-tax" pattern which
has persisted to the present day. In 1936 there was an interesting and short-
lived attempt at integration of the two taxes. President Roosevelt recom-
mended a graduation of the top corporate rate from 15% to 42.5%, with the
limitation that the higher rates would apply only to undistributed profit. 14
Thus, for example, a corporation with net income of $100,000 and dividend
distributions of $50,000 would pay a tax of $17,500, whereas a corporation
with the same net income and dividend distributions of only $15,000 would
pay a tax of $35,000. A vociferous protest from the business community pre-
vented the enactment of this proposal, but Congress did enact a compromise
proposal whereby the corporate tax remained at 15% and a surtax was im-
posed on undistributed profits at rates graduated from 7% to 27%, depend-
ing on the amount of profits retained. 15 Even this compromise was doomed
to an early demise. In 1938, the surtax was reduced to 2 %.16 Thereafter,
in the 1939 Code, the surtax was completely eliminated, and Congress re-
turned to the present system of double -taxation.17
As the rate of tax increased, the tax became a highly effective and impor-
tant revenue measure. In 1948, the tax take from corporations amounted to
$9.9 billion-just a little less than 25% of all federal tax revenues other than
payroll taxes.18 In 1973, the corporate income tax accounted for approxi-
mately $32 billion and continued to provide about 25% of all federal rev-
enues. 19
The taxation of corporate income at high effective rates is in large mea-
sure an outgrowth of the tax atmosphere of the 1930's, when revenue needs
were great and high effective tax rates on business were politically popular
and deemed to be in the nation's best interests. Certainly, the country's
revenue needs have not abated since then. World War II, the Korean War,
the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and desperately needed domestic programs
have kept federal revenue requirements high. Because of these revenue
needs, and in view of public acceptance of the notion that business-
particularly corporate business-is peculiarly capable of bearing a high tax
burden, the idea of abolishing the corporate income tax. has not attracted,
and cannot be expected to attract, a groundswell of public support.
13. Rev. Act of 1913, ch. 16, §§ II (A) (2), (G) (a), 38 Stat. 1648.
14. H.R. Doc. No. 418, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
15. Rev. Act of 1936, ch. 690, §§ 13, 14, 49 Stat. 1648.
16. Rev. Act of 1938, ch. 289, §§ 13, 27, 52 Stat. 447.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, ch. 1, §§ 22, 26-28, 53 Stat. 1.
18. See L. KIMMEL, supra note 1, at 19.
19. See Break & Pechman, Relationship Between the Individual and Corporate Income
Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 341, 349 (1975). (The authors' estimates are taken from the Brookings
Institution's Tax File.)
[Vol. 27:895
ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF INCOME
Nevertheless, the idea is gaining support among economists, tax commen-
tators, and a variety of others who are concerned with our system of taxa-
tion.20 It is the difficult task -of those who support abolition of the tax to
provide the analysis of and rationale for their position. Since that position is
not the politically appealing one, this analysis and rationale will have to sur-
vive the closest scrutiny if the abolition of the corporate tax is to succeed.
It should be stated at the outset that the proponents of integration fully
realize that simply doing away with the corporate income tax would cost the
Treasury a great deal of revenue. It is estimated that the Treasury will re-
ceive $61 billion in 1976 from the current double-level tax system, 21 and,
clearly, the amount generated by the current system is eliminated from fed-
eral tax revenues, it will have to be made up in some other way. If, for
example, a full imputation integration scheme were adopted in which the tax
at the corporate level was abolished and the shareholder was taxed on his
pro rata share of corporate income (as calculated under our present system),
it is estimated that the tax on shareholders would yield $42 billion.22 An
additional $12 billion in revenue could be raised if the federal government
would take the drastic step of taxing exempt organizations on their pro rata
share of corporate income.2 3 Assuming that these projections are reasonably
accurate, the loss to the Treasury would still amount to $7 billion. However,
it is quite unlikely that Congress would consider taxing the dividend income
of colleges, universities, foundations, churches, qualified pension and profit
plans, and virtually all private philanthropic, religious, and educational or-
ganizations. The loss to the Treasury, therefore, is apt to be an unmanage-
able $19 billion.
The full imputation-of-earnings scheme is sometimes accompanied by the
proposal that each shareholder be required to pay a tax on the annual ap-
preciation in the value of his shares to the extent that such appreciation
exceeds his pro rata share of the undistributed earnings of the corpora-
tion.24 This proposal raises valuation difficulties, particularly as to stock of
closely held corporations, in addition to problems caused by the requirement
20. See, e.g., G. BaAK & J. PECHMAN, supra note 8, at 90-104; McLure, supra note 4;
McLure, The Case for Integrating the Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 257 (1975).
On July 9, 1975, Treasury Secretary William Simon made a statement before the House
Ways and Means Committee that the Treasury had embarked on an in-depth study of integra-
tion proposals, methods, and effects. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1975). See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
21. Break & Pechman, supra note 19, at 349.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Eisner, A Hard Look at Corporate Taxes, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1974, at 18.
See also McLure, supra note 4, at 557-58.
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that income must be "realized" in order to be subject to tax.25 It is similar
to the tax treatment of partners who are required to pay tax on their respec-
tive shares of partnership distributable earnings, whether or not distri-
buted, 2 6 but partners are not taxed on unrealized appreciation in the value
of their partnership interests over and above undistributed partnership earn-
ings. (We use the term "earnings" throughout this article as a rough desig-
nator for accounting-type net income or net profits, or as a coarse equivalent
of taxable income in today's sense.)
Another approach to integration of the two taxes is the exemption of
dividend distributions from the corporate tax. This form of integration would
subject only undistributed corporate earnings to the corporate tax, but would
continue to tax the shareholder on dividend distributions. The estimated cost
of this proposal would range from $18 billion to $27 billion, depending upon
whether corporations change their dividend payout policies. 27  The $27 bil-
lion loss would occur only if dividend payouts were doubled; an $18 billion
loss would occur if there were no change in payouts at all. Whether Con-
gress adopted either a full or a partial integration scheme, the revenue loss
would be considerable. To compensate for this loss, the rates of other taxes
would have to be increased or new sources of revenue found.
III. TRADITIONAL RATIONALES FOR INTEGRATION
The reasons advanced for the abolition of the corporate tax and its inte-
gration into the individual income tax are of two kinds. The first type is
based primarily on the need for neutrality-the need to preserve the alloca-
25. See topics IV. B., C. infra. Our later analysis involves the notion that the "firm con-
tribution" to the firm owners' individual economic income is, generally speaking, the algebraic
combination of the amount actually severed from the firm's asset pool (that is, distributed to its
owners) and the change in the present value of the net worth (owners' segment) of the firm,
computed by capitalizing the projected future returns to be generated by the firm's assets as
they exist after the current distribution. See topic IV. A. infra.
Eisner suggests explicitly, though McLure does not, a deduction for depreciation in the
owners' share in the net worth of the firm. A system calling for taxation of shareholders on
undistributed current net profits, plus increases in net worth in excess of such current profit, is
not justified by our arguments because the change in net worth (on a capitalization of future
returns basis) may be greater or less than the absolute dollar amount of such profits. For exam-
ple, even if a $100 net profit is earned this year and retained, there may be an increase in the
net worth of the firm of only $90. To tax the firm owner on $100 (as a minimum amount) is to
tax him on more than the current period wealth-change effects of his ownership. If earnings for
the current period are retained, the wealth-change implications for the owner are accurately
measured simply by measuring the change in net worth of the firm by a capitalization of future
returns, without separate reference to the current period's profits.
26. I.R.C. §§ 701-04.
27. See Break & Pechman, supra note 19, at 345.
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tional efficiency of the economy. The second class of reasons relate to the
equity of the tax system. 28
A. The Economic Efficiency Arguments
The economic arguments supporting abolition of the corporate tax are
generally based upon two sets of conclusions. First, the double-level corpo-
rate income tax results in overtaxation of distributed corporate income. It
taxes corporate income more heavily, in the case of corporate firms with
relatively high dividend payout rates, than income from other sources, in-
cluding noncorporate business firms. This has the effect of placing the high-
payout corporation at a disadvantage as regards the primary sale of equity
and internal project decisions.2 9  The corporate firm may be forced to fi-
28. See G. BREAx & J. PECHmAN, supra note 8, at 4-13. We review, but do not discuss in
detail, the arguments advanced by economists and other observers of the tax system. A careful
and systematic restatement and analysis of these arguments appears in the now famous Report
of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission Report), which was published in 1966
and which contains a complete appraisal of the Canadian income tax system. Since the Canadian
system of taxation prior to 1972 is essentially similar to our own, most of the material contained
in the Carter Commission Report is fully applicable to our own system. The Canadian system of
modified integration is discussed in text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.
29. Tax effects aside, the equity of firms offering the same expected dollar return at the
same risk level (taking into account the firms' underlying asset projects and the terms of their
equity under applicable business associations laws) would normally command the same price in
the marketplace. The double-level tax has the effect of reducing the projected dollar return to
equity investors of the high-payout corporate firm. But the risk or uncertainty associated with
that dollar return determines the rate at which it is capitalized. Since risk, which is derived
from nontax sources, would remain unchanged, the high-payout corporate firm's equity would
command a lower price than that of its noncorporate counterpart. See McLure, supra note 20,
at 258-59. This conclusion is supported by considerable systematic thinking in the field of finan-
cial economics. See, e.g., E. FAiA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 170-75 (1972).
Consequently, whenever corporate equity must compete with a noncorporate financial invest-
ment opportunity of the same risk level, but offering a greater after-tax dollar return, corporate
equity will "lose," so long as it is assumed that investors are generally risk-averse. A weak
statement about this "inferiority" is that the corporate equity price will be lower than its non-
corporate competitor in order to equalize rates of return. In this sense, it can be said that
corporate equity will be sold at a lower price and will raise a smaller amount of proceeds than
noncorporate investment of the same risk class. McLure, supra note 20, at 261-62. In the
primary (issuer-sale) market, this principle really suggests the much stronger conclusion that
corporate equity simply should not be bought. The cost and projected dollar returns of the
underlying operating asset project of the issuing firm dictates both the specific dollar amount
which the firm must collect as proceeds from the sale of its equity and the specific dollar
amount of future return which can be expected by investors on their purchase price. The issu-
ing firm is not free to lower the price at which it sells equity.
The next question is whether doubly-taxed corporate equity ever competes in the market for
financial assets with noncorporate investments possessing the same risk level but a higher dollar
return. If such competition does not exist, it would be difficult to say that corporate equity is
disadvantaged vis-a-vis some other form of financial investment of the same risk level. The
competition does not seem to exist between the equity of a general partnership and the equity
19771
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of a corporation, even though both types of firms engage in the same underlying real asset
project, because the unlimited liability contract terms (set by business association law) of gen-
eral partnership equity makes it a riskier financial investment than the limited liability contract
terms of corporate equity. The case for competition is stronger in the financial investment mar-
ket between corporate equity and limited partnership equity, where both firms engage in the
same underlying asset project. Even here, however, it is arguable that the contract terms of
limited partnership ownership make it more risky than corporate equity because shareholders
have greater supervisory control than do limited partners. The differences in this respect, how-
ever, are becoming less and less palpable. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, Prefa-
tory Note at 1-2, § 302, Comment, § 303, Comment (1976 version).
There are additional financial investments which may compete with corporate equity at a
given risk level. In the firm equity category, a general partnership interest in a firm whose
underlying asset project is different from, and less risky than, that of a corporate firm may have
the same effective risk (the combination of underlying asset risk and contract term risk) as the
corporate firm's equity. If the corporate equity offers an inferior after-tax dollar return as com-
pared with the general partnership interest, the corporate equity will not be purchased in the
primary markets. Firm equity will still be purchased, in the form of partnership interests, but
assuming that the risk preferences of investors remain the same, investable wealth will be at-
tracted to the partnership firms whose underlying asset projects are less risky than those of
corporations. At any given risk level, firm equity may also compete with financial investment,
the proceeds from the sale of which do not lead to the formation of real capital. Again, if the
expected dollar return of the latter is superior, primary sales of corporate equity will be
blocked. Under this last assumption, however, investable wealth may be diverted into sectors of
the economy that do not increase the social wealth total-a matter of no mean economic signifi-
cance.
With regard to internal project decisions, corporate management, in pursuing its objective of
maximizing share value, decides whether to invest in underlying asset projects by determining
whether the present value of the future cash return to investors exceeds the cost of those
projects. Managers of high-payout corporate firms are aware that the dollar return received by
the equity holder will be reduced by the double tax. Thus, in order to achieve a present value
of future dollar return equal to the purchase price of any project, managers must capitalize that
return at a lower rate than that which would suffice if there were no double tax. This rate of
return may be lower than that demanded by the marketplace. See E. FAMA & M. MILLER,
supra at 276-319; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 94 n.1 (1970). See
also J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 117-18 (1971). If so, the managers must either not
engage in those production activities or face the prospect of lower market values for outstanding
shares. Of course, this assumes that managers consider the effects of internal investment deci-
sions on the value of their equity when making those investment decisions. See E. FAMA & M.
MILLER, supra, at 74-75. If managers are insulated from shareholder supervision, and need not
go to the equity markets, they may adopt some other driteria for pursuing real capital projects.
It must be noted that the observations of this and the preceding paragraphs of this footnote
relate to a period of disequilibrium, when capital is moving from the corporate sector to the
noncorporate sector. See McLure & Thirsk, A Simplified Exposition of the Harberger Model I:
Tax Incidence, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 14 n.29 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 31-35
infra.
At a given risk level, corporate equity may not compete with any other financial investment
opportunity. This possibility, even in a world of finite securities, lacks intuitive appeal, but,
should it exist, the reduction of dollar return on corporate equity, created by the double tax,
still makes such equity look less attractive as compared with consumption.
There is yet another troublesome policy aspect of double-level taxation which discourages
corporate equity investment. Limited shareholder liability is arguably intended to make corpo-
rate equity, as contrasted with its unlimited liability counterparts, a lower risk (and, of course,
lower return) investment, so that it will suit the risk-return preferences of more wealth holders.
This assumes that absolute risk tolerance varies inversely with wealth and that levels of personal
wealth vary inversely with the number of persons possessing them. By lowering the dollar
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nance with debt rather than with equity,30 and investable wealth may be
devoted either to financial investment other than corporate equity or to con-
sumption. These shifts in the use of wealth are viewed as artificial or ineffi-
cient because they are a result of methods of taxation.
McLure and Thirsk, following Harberger, have systematically elucidated
the social welfare losses created by a tax on capital (a factor of production) in
the corporate sector alone.31 In severely condensed form, the analysis pro-
ceeds as follows:
1. The imposition of the double-level tax on corporate payouts
is a tax on the income of the capital factor (real capital purchased
with the proceeds from the firm's sale of financial investment or
with cash flow) in corporate production. The double-level tax re-
sults in corporate-source income being taxed at a higher rate than
income from other sources, except where corporate earnings are
retained and value increases are taxed at capital gains rates to high
marginal bracket taxpayers.
2. In response to the initial lower net (after-tax) yield on capital
in the corporate sector, capital moves, during a period of dis-
equilibrium, to the noncorporate sector, until a new set of returns
on corporate and noncorporate capital is established. This move-
return to investors in corporate equity, the tax law makes corporate equity an inferior invest-
ment at any given risk level as compared with noncorporate investment producing non-double-
taxed returns. And, as indicated in the fifth paragraph of this footnote, even if such competition
does not exist, the double tax may reduce the return on equity to such a low point that it would
not entice wealth holders to switch from consumption to investment. Hence, assuming that all
investors, rich or poor, are risk-averse, the corporation law objective of broadening the appeal
of equity contributions to firms is subverted.
30. A high-payout corporate firm may seek to elude the effects described in the foregoing
footnote by shifting its capital structure to debt. But the tax doctrine of thin capitalization will
penetrate the form of some portion of the debt and relabel it equity. As a practical matter,
certain production activities cannot be financed with debt (of a kind which would not be charac-
terized as equity and whose yield would escape double taxation) without unacceptably increas-
ing the firm's exposure to insolvency in both the bankruptcy and equity senses.
Even if an all-debt corporation could successfully elude the tax collector's power to recast
debt as equity, the debt of such corporation would be riskier than the debt of a firm with
equity. See E. FAMA & M. MILLER, supra note 29, at 186. Thus, such a corporation would be
foreclosed from dealing with a class of potential debt purchasers whom noncorporate firms could
attract as a function of their ability to choose freely, without tax compulsion, a particular debt-
equity balance.
If movement to debt results in a lowering of the total value of a corporate firm's securities
(contrary to a considerable body of economic theorizing of the Modigliani-Miller school), the
attempt to elude the nonneutrality of double taxation would be offset by counterallocational
effects. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 332-33 (1976). Besides, a tax policy that forces a
corporation to load up on debt frustrates the objective of shareholder limited liability, namely,
encouraging the sale of firm equity. See the last paragraph of note 29 supra.
31. McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 20-22. See also J. PECHMAN, supra note 29, at
120-21.
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ment occurs because of the previously described "disadvantages"
regarding the primary sale of corporate equity and internal corpo-
rate decisionmaking. 32
3. After the movement of capital to the noncorporate sector,
the return in the noncorporate sector is driven downward, and re-
turns to owners of capital are equal. That is, the net (after-tax)
return to owners of corporate capital is the same as the noncorpo-
rate return, both gross and net, since there is no double tax in the
noncorporate sector. At this point, corporations are no longer pre-
judiced in the primary sale of their equity or in the making of
internal project decisions. This is so because corporate capital earns
a higher gross (before-tax) return, after the movement of capital out
of the corporate sector, than it did before the movement. 33
4. But during and after the period of disequilibrium (the capital
movement period), capital is reallocated to the noncorporate sec-
tor. This reallocation is a misallocation, in traditional economic so-
cial welfare terms, because it results in the production of fewer
units of corporate products, at higher prices, than would be
produced if the tax had not been imposed or if the tax had been
neutral (i.e., not caused a reallocation of factors). The number and
price of product units that would prevail, absent a tax that causes
reallocation of factors of production, is viewed as the efficient state,
or condition of highest social welfare, because they are the levels of
unit volume and price that best represent the preferences of prod-
uct consumers and suppliers of capital, absent tax disturbances.- 4
There is still another separate and distinct effect which the double-level
tax has on allocation of resources. The initial reduction of the net rate of
return on corporate capital and the post equilibrium reduction of the gross
and net rates of return of noncorporate capital may encourage wealth holders
to avoid investing and to choose consumption instead. 35
The second set of conclusions regarding neutrality or economic efficiency
are related to the first. Since undistributed earnings are not taxed to share-
holders and capital gains are preferentially treated, corporate firms may seek
to avoid the partiality of the double tax by accumulating earnings instead of
making dividend distributions. 3 6 From the point of view of investors, there
32. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 8-9. See also the first four paragraphs of note
29 supra.
33. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 9, 14 n.29. This new equilibrium position of
corporate firms accounts for our caveat that corporations are in an inferior position, as regards
the primary 6ale of equity and internal project planning, only during periods of disequilibrium.
See note 29 supra, fourth paragraph.
34. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 20-22.
35. See id. at 3 & n.7; McLure, supra note 4, at 541 n.44.
36. Of course, not all of the double-tax effects can be escaped by accumulations, even where
accumulations are not subject to penalty levies, because the capital gains tax must eventually be
paid.
It is interesting that Miller and Modigliani, in arguing the irrelevance of dividend payout
policy, doubted the ability of a corporate firm to improve the value of its equity by accumulat-
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is an incentive on the part of high bracket shareholders to invest in firms
paying relatively small dividends. 37  Because of these low payouts, more of
corporate earnings will be reflected in appreciated share values (at worst,
doubly taxed at some combination of corporate and individual capital gain
rates) than in dividends (doubly taxed at some combination of corporate and
individual ordinary income rates).38 This preference may create a distortion
in the manner of financing in favor of internal funding, and it may also add
to the attraction of wealth available for financial investment away from low-
growth industries.39
ing earnings. See Miller & Modigliani, Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares,
34 J. Bus. 411, 431-32 (1961).
Some, however, do not accept the Miller-Modigliani teaching that the value of a corporate
firm's shares should not be detrimentally affected, corporate tax law notwithstanding, by the
firm's payout policy. See id. For a discussion of the competing views, see J. LOmE & M.
HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET, THEoRiEs AND EVIDENCE 113-22 (1973). For them, there is
the chance that a policy of accumulation could offset prejudicial tax effects, but they, unlike
Miller and Modigliani, must also deal with the possibility that share value may be depressed by
such a policy. Again, attempts to evade tax-created allocational impact may be frustrated by
opposing nontax reactions.
Further, if retentions do occur solely in response to tax considerations, as a firm struggles to
free itself of the double-level tax prejudice, the capital retained may not be devoted to produc-
tion capacity, as in the case where a firm becomes overcapitalized and saves by lending to
others in transactions that do not lead immediately to the formation of real capital. Such savings
is offiet by the consumption of the borrower and does not lead to production and an increase in
social wealth. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION,
COORDINATION AND CONTROL 428 (1977). Thus, a tax incentive against dividend distributions
could exhibit still another type of nonneutrality.
37. Here the argument is that, theoretically, the equity of a low-payout corporate firm can
actually achieve, by virtue of a double-level tax system, superiority over noncorporate financial
investment in the eyes of taxpayers who have high marginal tax brackets. It is argued that
low-payout corporate firms may be able not only to neutralize the effects of the characteristics of
the double tax system but also to turn those characteristics to their advantage. But this view is
subject to the Miller-Modigliani argument that no tax-effect-neutralizing benefits can be reaped
by accumulating, and to the contention that, even if some reduction of tax prejudice could be
achieved, unfavorable countervailing nontax repercussions of a low-payout policy might be ex-
pected.
38. See McLure, supra note 20, at 259. As the preceding two footnotes indicate, however,
such tax-motivated behavior will occur only where there are clearly tax-engendered advantages
and no offietting nontax disadvantages created by adopting a low-payout policy.
39. See id. It is unclear whether, by use of the phrase "low-growth," McLure means to say
"low risk." If such be his intent, he might be suggesting that low-payout firms are high risk
firms and that the tax laws, if they force corporate firms to adopt low-payout policies, may favor
allocation of wealth available for financial investment to high risk enterprises. We are not con-
vinced that low-payout practices, if induced by a tax system, would be engaged in exclusively,
or even predominantly, by high risk firms. See the fourth paragraph of note 36 supra.
Retentions may force a firm to a low risk, low return status. Moreover, there is some doubt that
capital gains preference devices are the most effective way of attracting wealthier taxpayers in
our society to invest in the riskier securities available in the economy. See Mantell, The Effects
of Tax Exemption of Capital Gains on Demand for Risky Investment, 15 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus.
93 (1975); Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking,
83 Q.J. ECON. 263 (1969).
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It might be thought that the foregoing conclusions depend heavily upon
the assumption that the corporation cannot shift the corporate income tax
either forward to consumers in the form of price increases or backward to
suppliers and labor in the form of lower prices for goods and services. If
there is no management-originated shifting, presumably the tax is borne ini-
tially by the shareholders, whose dollar return on financial investment is
necessarily diminished by the amount of the corporate income tax, and ulti-
mately, as we have seen, there is a movement of the capital factor which
leads to a loss of social welfare. But can we assume that misallocation of
resources will not occur if the tax is shifted, say, onto consumers?
Before answering the foregoing question, we should first point out that
there is no agreement among economists or businessmen as to the incidence
of the corporate income tax.40 According to older thinking, it is assumed
that, in a competitive product market atmosphere, there are "marginal pro-
ducers" which make no economic profits (no more than "normal" profits)
and, it is further assumed, which pay no taxes at the corporate level. These
marginal corporate firms experience no increase in costs by way of taxes and
therefore need not raise their prices. If these marginal producers do not
raise their prices, the economically profitable (taxpaying) firms in the same
market cannot raise their product prices, because (assuming no price change
by the "marginal producer" competitor) an increase in price would cause the
marginal revenue of the taxpaying firm to ultimately drop below its marginal
costs.
4 1
Economists of the opposing viewpoint argue that the real world does not
necessarily operate according to classical economic models. No one is quite
certain what factors affect prices and wages, but there is respectable author-
ity for the proposition that the costs of the marginal producer are not the
critical factor.42 The development of oligopolies and administered prices has
seriously eroded the notion that a marginal producer can affect prices in an
industry in which several large firms account for all but a small percentage of
production. Consequently, the incidence of the corporate income tax re-
mains an unsettled issue. 43 There may be instances in which the tax is
either partially or entirely recouped through price increases, but in general
40. For an analysis of the authorities, and particularly of recent economic studies, see Klein,
The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, A Lawyer's View of a Problem in Economics,
1965 Wis. L. REV. 576. See also J. PECHMAN, supra note 29, at 111-16.
41. See L. KIMMEL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
42. See id. at 21-31.
43. "With the present state of knowledge, we do not know whether the tax is shifted
or not; there is certainly no conclusive evidence that it is fully or partially
shifted." J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 331 (1973).
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one cannot predict under what circumstances recoupment will occur. 44
There is little said in the literature about the possibility of "backward" shift-
ing, say, to labor. Perhaps this is because it is assumed that the price of the
labor factor is, realistically, quite rigid downward.4 5 If the corporate tax is
shifted forward to consumers, it is said to be a crude and, very likely, re-
gressive form of sales tax. If the tax is shifted backward to labor, it is said to
function as a capricious and indefensible payroll tax. 46
Even if, as some suggest, price-setting corporate producers are able to
raise prices in the short run in an attempt to shift the incidence of the
double-level corporate tax burden away from shareholders, 47 and even if we
assume that the price rise does in fact shift the incidence of burden,48 may
we also assume that there is no loss of economic efficiency from misallocation
of resources? The answer appears to be that we may not.49 Misallocation
can occur in connection with a variety of different incidence patterns prevail-
44. Professor Lester Thurow suggests that it is impossible to make quantitative measure-
ments of shifting. Thurow, The Economics of Public Finance, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 185, 187-89
(1975).
45. McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 17.
46. See McLure, supra note 20, at 261. The words "crude" and "capricious" presumably
refer to tax equity considerations. Crudity and capriciousness stem from the unsystematic and
potentially regressive aspects of these convoluted "shifting" taxes. We are unable to know or to
measure just what their effects will be, and yet we sanction them even though one of their
aspects may well be regressivity.
The shift-to-consumers assumption may also have misallocation of resources (i.e., noneffi-
ciency or loss-of-social-welfare) significance, however. See McLure, supra note 4, at 546-47; J.
PECHMAN, supra note 29, at 121.
47. See McLure, supra note 4, at 546; J. PECHMAN, supra note 29, at 112-13.
48. A price increase may not completely shift the post-short-run burden of the tax. Fdr an
analogous study of this problem involving an excise tax on corporate products in the context of
competitive general equilibrium, see McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 17-20.
49. See McLure, supra note 4, at 546-47; J. PECHMAN, supra note 29, at 121. Using partial
equilibrium monopoly analysis, one economist states the effects as follows:
Suppose that a specific tax is levied on the monopolist firm .... The tax is a
variable cost and shifts the average and marginal costs upward by the amount of the
tax. Faced with new cost curves . . . , the monopolist cuts output ... and raises
price . . . in order to maximize profits.
The monopolist is able to pass a part of the specific tax to the consumer through
a higher price and a smaller output. At the same time the monopolist's profits will
be smaller after the tax than before .... Total receipts of the monopolist at various
outputs are unchanged by the tax, but total cost at all outputs will be greater.
Profits at all possible outputs will be smaller than before, and maximum profits after
the tax will necessarily be smaller than they were before .... It appears that a
specific tax on the monopolist's product would reduce welfare rather than increase
it.
R. LEFTVICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM & RESOURCE ALLOCATION, 252-53 (1976). Though the
quoted analysis deals with a specific tax on a monopolist's product, it is adaptable to the
double-level corporate tax system because the latter is not a lump sum tax or a tax on pure
economic profits alone. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, ECONOMICS 483-84 (4th ed. 1975). It is
levied on the normal profits of the corporate firm and becomes a variable cost which affects
long-run marginal costs and prompts the pricesetter to raise his prices to maximize profits.
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ing after the short run.5 0 While a knowledge of the incidence of the post-
short-run burden is, in and of itself, of vital importance to a tax equity
analysis, one must look further to identify the economic efficiency levels
associated with various incidence conditions. 5 1 More important to the social
welfare issue (in straight economic terms) is the initial impact of the tax, its
influence on the movement of, and change in, gross returns on factors of
production, and its effect on product output and prices. The test for effi-
ciency involves an assessment of the post-short-run position of gross factor
returns, output, and prices, as compared with the levels of those parameters
in the sans-tax state.
The misallocations of resources that may accompany the double-level
corporate tax could be substantially eliminated if all production activities
could be freely shifted from the corporate to the noncorporate form. Indeed,
much of the discussion of misallocation assumes that certain products can be
made only by firms operating in the corporate form. The reason why certain
types of firms cannot convert to the noncorporate form may be implicit in
two observations. First, some production activities may require a minimum
dose of equity financing in order to avoid both bankruptcy and equity insol-
vency during their natural operational cycles. This requirement alone, of
course, would not explain a compulsion to adopt the corporate form, since
equity (in the sense of permanent investment entitled to residual, nonfixed
returns) can be sold by noncorporate firms. But, as we have noted, the
equity of a general partnership is riskier than corporate equity, assuming the
same underlying asset project for both, because the contract terms of general
partnership equity do not provide for limited liability. General partnership
equity, with respect to the higher risk production activities in our economy,
may thus lie outside the risk preferences of many wealth holders, whose
willingness to buy equity may be the key to the formation of capital in such
riskier firms. Hence, our second observation: Business associations law may
disallow, outside the framework of the corporate form, the packaging of total
firm risk so as to construct an equity investment that meets the risk toler-
ances of a group whose participation in investment might expand the amount
of equity securities demanded. In other words, as regards certain production
activities, only a corporate firm can tailor its financial capital structure so as
to minimize, in light of investor risk preferences, the difference between
equity desired by such firms and equity supplied by wealth holders.
50. McLure and Thirsk demonstate this fact within the context of an excise tax on
corporate-firm products. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 14-20, 22-23.
51. Indeed, one of the cases where there is no inefficiency caused by the double-level cor-
porate tax is also a situation in which the entire post-short-run burden of the tax is borne by
corporate equity. See id. at 12 for a discussion of the case where capital cannot move from the
corporate to the noncorporate sector.
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A blemish in the foregoing argument is created by the possibility that
equity can be raised in the limited partnership form. The contract-risk as-
pect of limited partnership ownership is arguably about the same as that of
corporate equity. On the other hand, it can be said that limited partnership
equity is riskier, by virtue of its contract terms, because limited partners do
not have the same supervisory prerogatives as those given to shareholders of
a corporation.5 2  Lack of liquidity, too, is a risk-type attribute associated
more with partnership equity than with corporate equity, at least in the
sphere of publicly held firms.5 3
Even if, by creative tailoring, limited partnership equity could be given
the same contract-risk attributes of corporate equity, there would still be two
powerful reasons why firms of the type we have been discussing5 4 would not
be set up in, or be converted to, the corporate form. First, unlike directors
of a corporation, the managers of a limited partnership will have unlimited
personal liability for the acts of the firm. Second, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice will apply the double-level corporate tax to limited partnership equity
which takes on too many corporate attributes.5 5
The obstacles to transferring certain kinds of production activities from
the corporate to the noncorporate form should not be. confused with the
immobility of capital between corporate and noncorporate sectors. The pres-
ence of barriers to a change in form is a principal ingredient of the economic
inefficiency result. Immobility of capital between corporate and noncorporate
sectors, on the other hand, would negate the possibility of inefficiency.
5 6
B. Tax Equity
The discussion of tax equity deals directly with the tax burdens suffered
by individuals, classified according to (1) their roles in the economy (e.g.,
furnishers of factors of production (labor and capital), savers, wealth holders,
and consumers (nonsavers and dissavers)), and (2) their ability to pay. In
short, the equity objective of income taxation is to establish criteria for de-
52. See the second paragraph of note 29 supra.
53. It is not unusual for limited partnership equity to be distributed to the public and to
thereafter be "traded" only sporadically, if at all.
54. That is, firms that require substantial equity investment and which, in order to raise
that equity, must tap the wealth of persons at the lower levels of absolute risk aversion.
55. See, e.g., Cabinet & Coffey, Housing Partnerships: Shelters from Taxes and Shelters for
People, 20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 723, 734-39 (1969). The Internal Revenue Service has been
taking a narrow view of the circumstances under which a limited partnership can escape the
double-level tax, but the courts and certain sectors of public opinion have been paddling in the
other direction. For the latest episodes, see Philip G. Larson, 65 T.C. 63 (1975), withdrawn
and reissued, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), appeal docketed, No. 1056-77 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1976); Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3, 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977), withdrawn, 42 Fed. Reg. 1489
(1977).
56. See note 51 supra.
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termining who should relinquish some of their share of income to the gov-
ernment and in what quantities they should relinquish it. 57 Judgments con-
cerning tax equity, though they are "economic" in the general sense that
they involve the imposition of burdens on economic agents, are not fully
explicable in terms of systematic economic thought. This is so because
equity decisions-for example, the rule that it is better to collect 10% of a
low income and 50% of a high income, instead of taking a constant rate of
both-imply the existence of a gauge or measuring device, other than the
explicit signals of individuals exhibited in their voluntary exchanges and dis-
positions, by which we can say that the involuntary loss of a small amount of
a low income is somehow about as "fair" as the involuntary loss of a larger
amount of a higher income. The deeper implications of the fairness conclu-
sion must be akin to a conviction that the psychological impacts on the high
and low income recipients are about the same, or the judgment that, by
some common denominator, society is better off by taxing progressively, ir-
respective of the personal feelings of the individuals taxed. These are mat-
ters about which many economists remain agnostically mute, except to point
out inefficiencies of the sort treated above, which are susceptible of mea-
surement in terms of voluntary transactions.
That is not to say that choosing an efficiently neutral tax will not have
consequences with respect to incidence. Achieving welfare efficiency for any
given tax will have particular incidence results.5 8 On the other hand, inef-
ficiencies can exist under a variety of incidence patterns, and an inefficient
tax may ultimately be borne by classes of individuals other than those upon
whom it is ostensibly imposed.
The precept of "horizontal" equity states that recipients of income should
not bear disparate income tax burdens simply because of the source of their
income. The double-level corporate tax, to the extent that it is not success-
fully shifted to labor or consumers, is seen as violative of this principle,
because it is borne primarily by those who receive income from furnishing
investment in the corporate and noncorporate sectors. Where the concept of
horizontal equity finds its origins is difficult to say. It is not immediately
obvious why it is "unfair" to vary tax burdens according to income source.
Providing incentives for the making of economic choices that generate the
most desirable conditions in the economy may be an aspect of fairness. En-
couraging consumption of current income (nonsaving) or of wealth (dissaving)
may be a reasonable basis of classification, and this result might be achieved
by increasing the burden on income from activities that constitute deferral of
consumption. Similarly, it might be reasonable or fair to encourage deferral
of consumption in favor of the formation of real capital by decreasing the tax
57. See generally G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, supra note 8, at 5-7.
58. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 12-14, 17, 20-21.
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on income from furnishing the capital factor of production. A discrimination
between the income tax burden on labor and capital might occur in the
foregoing instances, but it results from the objective of changing the relative
levels of consumption and real investment, rather than from any preference
between capital or labor income.
It might be argued, then, that the double-level corporate tax does not
violate horizontal equity because it is a legitimate attempt to discourage real
investment and to encourage consumption. Aside from the almost bizarre
inappropriateness of such an economic policy under present circumstances,
however, the double tax on the income of corporate equity seems an awk-
ward and haphazard way of achieving the desired result. There are two prin-
cipal shortcomings. First, where no firm-originated shifting to consumers oc-
curs (via price increases), the tax still falls on both consumers and capital. 59
Second, because of the partial (corporate only) nature of the tax, it is ac-
complished at a loss of social welfare. 60 Of course, if shifting to consumers
is substantially successful, the pro-consumption incentive objective of the
scheme is largely thwarted. For these reasons, a double tax on the income of
corporate equity seems ill-designed to achieve the plausibly fair objective of
encouraging consumption, and the cavalier theoretical lack of concern for its
effectiveness and side effects may be the true source of its "unfairness."
Any preferential tax rate for capital gains type income is also subject to
criticism on horizontal equity grounds. Again, however, the incentive
rationale is at least a prima facie basis for reasonable classification by income
source. Our present corporation-shareholder tax system provides for capital
gains treatment of corporate source "income" (as that term is defined today)
in a variety of ways at both the corporate and shareholder levels. These
special treatments must be either reconciled to the rule or branded as trans-
gressions. We have suggested that incentives may well be admissible as an
element of horizontal equity, but fairness would presumably require that
there be a respectable a priori case for effectively achieving the incentive by
the means chosen.
Judged by the standard of "vertical" equity-the notion that the income
tax burden should increase progressively with the recipient's ability to pay,
as gauged by the size of his income-the double-level corporate tax is sub-
ject to several attacks. Under the assumption that the tax is not successfully
shifted to labor or consumers, low income shareholders of the corporation
bear a greater burden than high income taxpayers. This holds true irrespec-
tive of the corporate firm's payout policy, although it is exacerbated in the
low payout case. 6 ' The burden that seeps into the noncorporate sector dur-
59. See id. at 11.
60. See topic III. A. supra.
61. See G. BREAK & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFoIm 91-94 (1975).
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ing and after the period of disequilibrium is proportional on capital factor
income, but, in the sense that it is not progressive, it violates the vertical
equity concept. Further, to the extent that the corporate level portion of the
double tax falls upon consumers or labor, by shifting or otherwise, the tax is
likely to be regressive. It should be noted again that, just as a firm-
originated price increase may not guarantee a complete shifting to consum-
ers, there may be some tax incidence on consumers, even though the corpo-
rate firm does not initially raise product prices. 62
Perhaps the most fundamental equity issue is the principle that a pur-
ported income tax should tax only "income." An identification of the nature,
timing, and amount of income thus becomes critically important. We next
address ourselves to these issues, at the firm and individual. levels, and at-
tempt to show the relationship, in economic income terms, between the
income of the firm and the income of its equity owners.
IV. CORPORATE INCOME-WHAT IS IT?
WHEN DOES IT OccuR? AND WHO OWNS IT?
A. An Economic Income Analysis
It is odd that, despite the great wealth of material that has been written
in recent years on fundamental issues of tax policy, there has been no sys-
tematic treatment of the corporate income tax in terms of the nature, timing,
and amount of firm income, and the relation of these items to the income of
individual firm owners. This is particularly strange in light of the fact that tax
policy writers have relied heavily on economic concepts in fashioning sys-
tems of income taxation based upon the comprehensive tax base, upon con-
sumption, and upon cash flow. One might have expected that intimacy with
economic definitions of income would have produced some insights into the
relation between economic concepts of corporate income and the corporate
income tax, but there has been very little written on this issue. 3 The
primary concern of most writers has been the personal income tax, and,
62. See McLure & Thirsk, supra note 29, at 11.
63. The lack of material on this subject is probably due to the fact that lawyers and many
accountants are simply not accustomed to thinking of corporate income, as determined for fi-
nancial statements and for income tax purposes, in relation to formulations and definitions of
income fashioned by economists.
In a related field, however, financial economists, engaged in the process of rethinking the
goals of accounting, have explicitly explored the economic concept of firm income as a step in
their analysis of the relationship between investor uses of information, the function of account-
ing systems, and alternate accounting systems. See, e.g., Revsine, Replacement Cost Account-
ing: A Theoretical Foundation, in 2 AICPA, OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 178,
183-85 (1974); Ronen, Discounted Cash Flow Accounting, in id. 143, 151-52; Sorter, Account-
ing Income and 'Economic Income, in id. 104-05.
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while most of their conclusions require a redefinition of gross income which
would greatly affect the treatment of unrealized gains on corporate sec-
urities, the issue of the double taxation of corporate income has remained at
the periphery of their thinking and not at its core. 64
If we pursue the economists' conception of what constitutes income
beyond its immediate implications for a comprehensive income tax base, we
find that it has significant implications for corporate income taxation as well,
quite apart from the general theme of the equity and economic efficiency
effects of the double tax on dividends.
Economists have suggested generally that there is no economic signifi-
cance in the distinction between an individual shareholder and his corpora-
tion. Consequently, to an economist, the position of a shareholder is really
no different from the position of a sole proprietor in terms of his being a
furnisher of capital. The individual's equity simply represents the "firm as-
pect" of his wealth-that is, the portion of his wealth which is diverted from
consumption and devoted to production. Since the shareholder and the cor-
poration are simply two views of a single economic condition, the share-
holder is in reality the owner of his proportionate share of corporate income.
The concept of the identity between the corporate firm and its owners
has been raised in the debates concerning valuation models in portfolio and
capital market theory. The specific question in that context is what species of
"return"--e.g. expected dividends, as contrasted with expected total cash
flows to the firm-are capitalized to arrive at the present value of shares. In
that controversy, there is considerable support for the proposition that total
expected cash flows, whether or not they are to be distributed, should be-
determinative of value. This conclusion might be viewed as premised par-
tially on the generalized notion that there is no material separation between
the corporation and the stockholder. 65
Recently, Professor McLure, in discussing tax equity, stated:
It simply makes no sense to speak of vertical equity in the taxation
of the corporation vis-a-vis the taxation of an individual. This is
especially true when we recognize that, so far as the earning of
income for tax purposes is concerned, the corporation is simply the
aggregate of its owners and can best be characterized as a "con-
duit" through which income earned in the corporation is passed to
64. See, e.g., Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock,
76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967).
65. See J. LoarE & M. HAmLTON, supra note 36, at 113-19, for a discussion of differing
points of view. Actually, the proofs for the proposition that payout policy is immaterial to valua-
tion are more complicated than a simple assertion of an identity between a corporation and its
shareholders. See id. at 119-22. The arguments do, however, present a systematic basis for the
belief that those factors which are value determinants for the corporate firm, considered sepa-
rately, are reflected rather fully and immediately in the economic condition of its shareholders.
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the shareholders as dividends or retained earnings. Under this
view, the corporation cannot be said to have tax paying ability
beyond that of its shareholders. 6
6
These perspectives on corporation-shareholder relationships must be rec-
ognized as only analogous to the question of how corporate firm income
relates to the individual income of its owners. McLure's statement is a sim-
ple reminder that "corporateness" involves real people. The portfolio and
capital markets theory involves projecting future returns and, at any given
moment, establishing, ex ante their actualization, the present value of those
expected returns in terms of their timing, amount, and uncertainty. In con-
trast, the income question asks, ex post, about actual changes in some quan-
tity, which we call income, over a given period.
Nonetheless, these analogous views of the corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship tend to produce policy conclusions for the taxation of corporate in-
come, however that term is defined. In a rough way, they provide a concep-
tual rationale for not taxing the corporation at all and for totally integrating
the corporate income tax into the individual income tax. Specifically, an un-
differentiated identification of shareholders with their corporation might
support integration by an imputation of undistributed earnings to share-
holders. The argument is appealing: If the corporation is a "conduit" through
which dividends and retained earnings are passed to its residual owners, the
shareholders, then it is a conduit in the same sense that a grantor's trust or a
partnership is a conduit. And as a conduit, it should be taxed in the same
manner as the trust or partnership-no tax should be imposed on the
conduit-entity, but a tax should be levied on the recipients to whom the
earnings belong. The argument is a simple syllogism: Earnings are taxed to
the individual taxpayer who owns them. The earnings of a corporation are
owned by its shaieholders; therefore, the earnings of a corporation should be
taxed to its shareholders.
Upon an investigation of the characteristics of firm and firm-owner in-
come, in the economic sense, we arrive at the conclusion that corporate firm
income is immediately impounded into the income picture of its individual
owners, and that there is consequently no warrant for taxing the corporation.
We also conclude that it is appropriate to include immediately a share of
firm economic income in the shareholders' individual income calculation.
However, our analysis does not support an imputation of undistributed
current-period earnings, as such, to shareholders.
Many economists suggest that the proper base for income taxation of in-
dividuals is the Haig-Simons definition of income.67 This definition, pro-
66. See McLure, supra note 4, at 535.
67. See, e.g., Panel Discussions on Income Tax Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1960) (statement by Mr. Brazer).
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posed by Henry Simons in 1938, has become the focal point of much of the
recent discussion of personal income tax reform. The Haig-Simons definition
conceives of income as the "algebraic sum of (1) the market value of all
rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in ques-
tion." 68 In other words, an individual's income is seen as the value of what
he consumes during the taxable period, plus the increase, or minus any
decrease, in his net worth during that period. With respect to investments
held by individuals, net worth changes are determined on a capitalization-
of-future-returns basis.
While the Haig-Simons definition of income was intended to apply to the
individual, 69 there is no reason why it cannot be applied to the corporation.
The notions of consumption and accumulation have their natural counter-
parts in the corporate firm, although a firm does not consume resources in
the same manner as an individual and its accumulations are offset by obliga-
tions which run to its investors. Nevertheless, the Haig-Simons definition
can be adapted to fit the corporate context as follows: Corporate economic
income is the algebraic sum of (1) distributions to investors, less advances
from investors, and (2) the change in the value of its net worth during the
income period. 70 Again, change in net worth is a function of a capitalization
of the stream of returns that the firm can generate in the future.
Combining the economic formulations of firm and individual incomes, we
see that, in measuring the income of the corporation, we are really measur-
ing an aspect of the income of its investors. Each facet of the corporation's
income is immediately assimilated to the individual owner's income. Dis-
tributions will find their way immediately into the consumption or accumula-
tion component of the individual owner's income, but not necessarily in the
exact amount of the distribution, because changes in the net worth of an in-
dividual are also calculated, with respect to investments, by capitalizing future
returns. 71 Fluctuations in the corporation's net worth will be reflected as an
end-of-period wealth change in the accumulation component of the indi-
68. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62, 206 (1938).
69. Id.
70. See authorities cited in note 63 supra. For example, Sorter says: "Economic income for
a firm is generally defined as the change in the value of the firm plus any dividends paid during
the period."
71. When we say that firm economic income is assimilated, or that it contributes, to the
economic income of the individual firm owner, we mean that it is automatically picked up as an
intermediate step in the individual owner's economic income calculation. The details of the
calculation may vary with the individual, depending on events transpiring at the individual level
during the income period. For example, with respect to a firm distribution, there may be
adjustments in the individual calculation. If the distribution is all spent on consumption, then it
will pass through fully, in dollar amount, to the final total of the individual recipient's economic
income. However, if the individual distributee uses part of the distribution to buy a new in-
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vidual owner's income. If the shareholder has transacted in shares of the
corporation during the income period, changes in the corporation's net
worth may be allocated between the consumption and the change-of-net-
worth components of his economic income (or the economic income of some
other individual, in a manner similar to that described in footnote 71). Thus,
vestment during the income period, the new investment contributes to the capitalized-future-
return net worth segment of the individual's economic income. The amount of the latter con-
tribution may be more or less than the amount of the distribution used to buy the new invest-
ment. The foregoing should not lead to the mistaken conclusion that some amount of firm
economic income might escape the income base if one looks only to the economic income of
individuals, for the distributee in the foregoing illustration bought his investment from someone
else, whose consumption and net worth changes will be reflected in the total economic income
of all individuals.
Imagine a world of one corporate firm, X, having two shareholders, A and B, each owning
one half of the entire equity (say 10 shares each) of X. At the beginning of the income period,
the net worth (stockholders' equity) of X, on a capitalized-future-return basis, is $1,000. During
the period, X earns $100 and distributes $50 each to A and B. At the end of the period, the
capitalized-future-return net worth of X is $950. The economic firm income is $50. IfA and B
engage in no intra-period consumption or transactions in X stock, the firm's economic income
shows up in A's and B's individual economic incomes as follows:
Consumption Change in Net Worth
A -0- Cash $50
Stock value change ($25)
$25
B -0- Cash $50
Stock value change ($25)
$25
Now suppose that, during the income period, A had used his $50 distribution to buy 1 share
of X stock from B. B bought candy bars with the $50 received from A; B ate all the candy bars
during the period. Firm economic income is still $50, but it shows up in the economic incomes
of A and B in different ways:
Consumption Change in Net Worth
A -0- Stock value change
(11 shares) $22.50
B $50 Cash $50.00
Stock value change
(9 shares) ($72.50)
($22.50)
A's economic income is $22.50, and B's economic income is $27.50-accounting for the entire
amount of firm economic income.
From time to time, we state that, if economic income is to be the tax base, it is unnecessary
to impose a tax at the corporate level, because the economic income of the firm is fully reflected
in the economic income of individual firm owners. This holds strictly true where, during the
income period, shareholders (1) consume all distributions, and (2) do not change their invest-
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any economic income of a corporation is fully taken into account by the
Haig-Simons definition of individual income. Furthermore, corporate income
is included in individual income in the same period for which it is corporate
income. Therefore, corporate income cannot be income distinct from, or
over and above, individual economic income; nor can it be the economic
income of individuals in a different taxable period. Since the economic in-
come of the corporate entity is immediately and simultaneously the income
of individuals, the economist concludes that the corporation and the
shareholders represent a single taxable unit. 72
As regards retained earnings, two observations flow from the foregoing
analysis. First, retained earnings, even current undistributed earnings, are
not includable, per se, in the individual shareholder's income calculation.
Undistributed earnings may, indirectly, find their way into the shareholder's
income computation in the sense that they might facilitate a distribution or
influence the end-of-period projections of the firm's future returns and, in
the process, obliquely cause a change in the present value of those future
returns. But no specific reference should be made to retained earnings, cur-
rent or otherwise, as discrete amounts. Second, earnings (current or prior
earnings retentions) have no independent significance as a measure of the
amount of income represented by distributions to shareholders. Any dis-
tribution enters the shareholder's income calculation 73 along with a share of
any change in the capitalized-future-return net worth of the firm.
Whether a distribution is "covered" by current or prior period earnings is of
no significance.
Finally, distributions in any given period cannot be included in the in-
come of shareholders without also including a portion of the changes in the
capitalized-future-return value of the corporate firm's net worth. To include
the amount of a distribution in a shareholder's income, without also taking
into account a reduction in the net worth of the firm, would result in a tax
ment in the firm. But, as is seen from the two preceding paragraphs of this footnote, a firm's
economic income is not always accounted for fully simply by looking at firm owners' individual
incomes; sometimes a part of the firm's economic income is shifted by intra-period transactions
into the individual economic incomes of those other than firm owners. In any event, it is still
unnecessary to tax the firm separately, because its economic income is fully accounted for in the
economic incomes of some group of individuals, firm owners or not.
72. Financial economists have sometimes used this argument in discussing the role of ac-
counting systems. See, e.g., Sorter, supra note 63, at 107:
In fact, it may be argued that a firm cannot have income. If income is indeed a
measure of better-offness, can a firm be better off apart and distinct from the
better-offness of stockholders, managers, or employees? People may be better-off,
but a firm, a fictional entity, cannot be better-off and thus does not have income. In
our view, value should always be defined in relation to an individual's goal and not
abstractly. Income also should not be defined in the abstract since it relates to the
satisfaction of individual goals.
73. See note 71 supra.
1977]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
on something other than economic income; it would be an excise tax on the
partitioning of a portion of the shareholder's wealth from its location in the
corporation to the shareholder's. other modes of ownership. Furthermore, as
we have noted before, the amount of the distribution need not be separately
referred to in computing the shareholder's individual economic income. It
,will, in a self-executing way, work its way into the consumption or change-
in-net-worth components of the Haig-Simons formulation.
In summary, the following principles emerge:
1. All aspects of the corporate firm's economic income are, in
the period during which such income is experienced, impounded
into the economic income calculations of individuals.
2. It is unnecessary to tax the corporate firm separately to
reach firm contributions to individual economic income; a tax base
consisting of the economic income of individuals will account fully
for all firm economic income.
3. Taxation of undistributed current earnings, as such, is incon-
sistent with the principle of taxing only economic income.
4. The amount of firm earnings, past or current, should play no
independent role in the determination of income, absent distribu-
tions, and should not be used as a measure for the amount of in-
come inherent in a distribution.
5. Including distributions in individual shareholder income,
without also adjusting the shareholder's income in light of fluctua-
tions in the firm's net worth (on a capitalization-of-future-returns
basis), is inconsistent with the principle of taxing only economic
income.
These conclusions are incompatible with the present system of
corporation-shareholder taxation, particularly because the present system
taxes at two levels, andc at neither level does it take account of the end-of-
period rise or fall of the firm's capitalized-future-return net worth.
Moreover, it uses current or accumulated earnings as a measure of the con-
tribution of distributions to individual income. Hence, the present
corporation-shareholder system does not compute the tax base pursuant to
economic income principles. The economic income analysis points in the
direction of integration, but not to a system that would tax the shareholder
on his share of undistributed current earnings, as such, nor to one that
would tax distributions to shareholders without adjustment of individual
shareholder income for changes in the capitalized-future-return net worth of
the corporate firm.
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B. Constitutional Ramifications: Does It Matter
What Corporate Income Is and Who Owns It?
It is temptingly easy to counter the foregoing economic justification
of the full integration proposal with the simple argument that nothing requires
us to accept as final and immutable the manner in which the conception of
economic income establishes the irrelevance of any distinction between
firms and individuals. According to this latter view, the corporation-
shareholder relationship can be defined for the purposes of taxation (and
presumably for other purposes of national policy) in any manner which Con-
gress deems proper. Richard B. Goode, writing in 1951, took the position
that there is no reason why any country cannot choose to impose both cor-
porate and individual income taxes, to determine how they will interrelate,
and to decide what weight will be given to each, without regard to theoret-
ical models of a comprehensive tax system. 74 Professor Stanley Surrey has
suggested that the adoption of partial integration schemes in other countries
has not been motivated by the "tax theology" of corporation-shareholder
unity, but rather by other national policy goals, such as more active capital
markets and reduction of foreign ownership.7 5 According to some, there-
fore, if there are at least two tax theologies of the corporation-shareholder
relationship, a legislator is not a tax sinner if he prefers one to the other.
Neither theology is preordained.7 6
But whatever the situation in other countries may be, the position that
there are two or more tax theologies available to Congress is not entirely
self-evident. Initially, the sixteenth amendment empowers Congress to levy
a tax on "incomes, from whatever source derived." 7 7 Any direct tax other
than an income tax must be apportioned. 78 Congress' freedom to tax is
constrained, and it is therefore necessary to point out that the Constitution
does require the adoption of a particular tax theology for the taxation of
corporations and shareholders in the sense that the base of the tax must be
income within the meaning of the Constitution.
We think it too cavalier and unconstructive to assume that the sixteenth
amendment was not meant to convey some univocal meaning, by which the
permissible unapportioned tax could be distinguished from other direct
taxes. Presumably, "income" should be given some fundamental content,
and should not be allowed to float freely on the shifting tides of tax
theologies. It is at least reasonable to assume that the word "income" was
74. R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 203-05, 214-17 (1951).
75. Surrey, Reflections on Integration of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28
NAT'L TAx J. 335, 338-39 (1975).
76. Id. at 335.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; Id. art I, § 9, ci. 4.
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meant to establish a tax base that is uniform in light of relevant policy, and
we suggest that economic insights are as relevant as any for the purpose of
defining the income base. Specifically, we have adduced the concept of
economic income as a potential rationalizing element in corporation-
shareholder tax systems. We next discuss the extent to which the Supreme
Court's views are consistent with the economic income principles developed
under the preceding topic.
It is generally accepted that Congress, by enacting section 61 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and its predecessors, intended 79 to use the full extent of
its grant of constitutional authority to tax all "incomes, from whatever source
derived." Congress did not, however, adopt any particular definition of
income beyond an enumeration of examples of gross income which is clearly
not exhaustive.80 In 1920, seven years after the adoption of the sixteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court rendered its first and perhaps most impor-
tant decision on the issue of what constitutes taxable income when share-
holders do not receive a cash or a property distribution. The case was Eisner
v. Macomber,81 and it not only involved the issue of what constitutes "in-
come" for personal income tax purposes, but also contained an important
discussion of the corporation-shareholder relationship.
The facts of Macomber are relatively simple. Mrs. Macomber, a holder of
2200 shares of common stock of the Standard Oil Company of California,
received a 50% stock dividend of common on common.8 2 The corporation
reflected the issuance of this stock dividend on its books by capitalizing its
surplus (i.e., by transferring an amount equal to the par value of the distrib-
uted shares from the surplus account to the capital stock account). Since the
dividend shares were distributed pro rata to the holders of the common
stock, the distribution did not change their proportionate holdings of com-
mon stock in any way. The Commissioner asserted that the receipt of the
common stock dividend, to the extent that it represented the capitalization
of post-1913 earnings, constituted income to the recipients. This position was
supported by section 2(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916,83 which defined tax-
able dividends to include payments made by a corporation "out of its earn-
ings or profits accrued since March 1, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and
payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corporation,
... which stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its
cash value." Mrs. Macomber maintained that a stock dividend was not in-
come within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment and that the definition
79. See, e.g., Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935).
80. I.R.C. § 61.
81. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
82. That is, she received an additional 1,100 shares of common stock.
83. Ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
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of income in section 2(a) had overstepped constitutional bounds by including
stock dividends, measured by earnings, as income.
In determining whether a stock dividend constitutes income, the major-
ity began with the prerihise that income, in common parlance, may be de-
fined as the "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined." 84 Interestingly, the government based its argument upon the same
definition, but, according to Justice Pitney, it placed undue emphasis upon
the word "gain" and ignored the words "derived from capital." In order to
appreciate the impact of this difference in emphasis, it may be instructive to
quote Justice Pitney's precise language:
"Derived-from--capital";--"the gain--derived-from--capital",
etc. Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to
capital, not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a
gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from
the property, severed from the capital however invested or
employed, and coming in, being "derived," that is, received or
drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit
and disposal;-that is income derived from property. Nothing else
answers the description.8 5
Since the sixteenth amendment uses the phrase "incomes, from whatever
source derived," Justice Pitney concluded that the common parlance mean-
ing of income as "gain derived from" is implicit in the wording of the
amendment; that income, in the constitutional sense, encompasses only that
gain which is severed from capital and received or drawn by the recipient
for his use and disposal.
The majority next considered whether a common on common stock div-
idend comes within this constitutional definition and concluded that it does
not. A stock dividend, it was reasoned, severs nothing from capital; nothing
from the -shareholder's investment. On the contrary, it cements the earnings
of a corporation into the corporate capital structure and in the end the
shareholder has no more and no less than he had before. It is only when
corporate assets are actually segregated from the common corporate fund
and paid out to shareholders that income is "derived" from capital.8 6
Even if the Macomber majority had not expressly rejected the view that
income (in some sense) to the corporation is simultaneously and fully income
(in some sense) to the shareholders, such a rejection appears, at first blush,
to be implied by the Court's doctrine of realization: If a shareholder does not
derive income from the capitalization of earnings and the distribution of
84. 252 U.S. at 207.
85. Id. (emphasis original).
86. Id. at 208-09.
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stock dividends, he certainly does not derive income from the mere exis-
tence of undistributed corporate income. Justice Pitney, however, left noth-
ing to the imagination. In discussing whether a stock dividend constituted
income within the constitutional definition, he concluded that the result de-
pends upon the nature of the corporation and the shareholder's relation to it:
Short of liquidation, or until dividend[s are] declared, [the stock-
holder] has no right to withdraw any part of either capital or
profits from the common enterprise; on the contrary, his interest
pertains not to any part, divisible or indivisible, but to the entire
assets, business, and affairs of the company. Nor is it the interest of
an owner in the assets themselves, since the corporation has full
title, legal and equitable, to the whole.... [A]s a stockholder, he
has no right to withdraw, only the right to persist, subject to the
risks of the enterprise, and looking only to dividends for his re-
turn.
87
We pause here to examine more closely the consistency of the Macomber
holding with the concept of economic income developed above. Read very
narrowly, Macomber holds that, absent a distribution, the earnings of a cor-
poration may not be used, as such, to measure the amount of income ex-
perienced by shareholders. This holding is in line with our conclusion that
the amount of corporate earnings should play no independent role in deter-
mining the income experienced by a shareholder. The Court was not pre-
sented with the argument that Mrs. Macomber could be taxed on her share
of the income-period increase in the net worth of the corporation, computed
on a capitalization-of-future-return basis. Thus, the dialectic of the Court
aside, the holding can be explained in terms of economic income concepts: If
a shareholder is to be taxed without a distribution, the earnings (past or
current) cannot be the measure of the income. The proper measure is the
stockholder's share of the rise or fall (over the relevant income period) in the
capitalized-future-return net worth of the corporate firm.
Perhaps the Court sensed the impropriety of using the measure of in-
come advanced by the government in Macomber. Unfortunately, the Court
struck back with its exaggerated "severance" concept of income. Going still
further, the Court suggested, in dictum, that distributions are income, pre-
sumably without adjustment of individual shareholder income for income-
period changes in the corporation's capitalized-future-return net worth. This
approach to distributions is clearly at odds with the economic concept of firm
income, owner income, and the relationship between the two. Nevertheless,
were it not for some further language in Macomber, we could perhaps pare
away the Court's statements about the income significance of distributions
87. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
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and assume that the result in the case stems from the government's attempt
to incorrectly measure income in the nondistribution context. But there are
additional indicators in Macomber that there can be no income to share-
holders, on any theory, without some sort of severance, such as a cash or
property dividend or an exchange.
Macomber clearly chooses a tax theology which is based upon an extreme
application of the entity theory of corporations. It is more than that, how-
ever. Justice Pitney did not, to be sure, specifically anticipate the economic
definitions of firm and individual income, but he was aware of the possibility
that an increase in corporate net worth (however reckoned), which increases
the net worth of an individual shareholder by increasing the value of his
investment, might be included in a shareholder's income tax base. Justice
Pitney explicitly rejected this idea when he said that "a growth or increment
of value in the investment" is not a gain "derived from" capital and hence
not taxable under the sixteenth amendment. 88
Thus, even if the government had argued that Mrs. Macomber should be
taxed on her pro rata share of income-period increases in the capitalized-
future-return net worth of the corporation, the Court's opinion would proba-
bly have remained the same. It seems that the Supreme Court has not only
adopted a tax theology based upon the separate legal and tax status of corpo-
rations and shareholders, but it has also rejected the implications of the
economic definitions of firm and individual income. One can only conclude
that the Macomber majority would have viewed as tax heresy any suggestion
for the full integration of the corporate and individual income tax which
would include corporate income in the income of the shareholder without a
distribution or exchange.
Nonetheless, we reiterate the conclusion that, given the arguments ad-
vanced by the government in Macomber, the result of the case is in line
with economic income analysis: Mrs. Macomber's income should not have
been measured by the retained earnings of the firm. in which she was a
shareholder. The measure should have been her portion of the income-
period increase in the net worth of the corporation, not on the basis of book
or current asset values, but on the basis of a capitalization-of-future-returns.
If there was no such increase, the Court was correct in saying that Mrs.
Macomber would have been taxed on pre-income-period capital. Again, we
point out that the Court's obiter statements about the income status of dis-
tributions are clearly inconsistent with economic income principles to the
extent that the Court did not seem to require a recognition of the changes in
net worth at the firm and shareholder levels.
It has been suggested by some tax commentators that the Macomber
Court's apparent insistence upon severance as a sine qua non of income
88. Id. at 207 (emphasis original).
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status no longer represents the Supreme Court's tax theology.8 9 The or-
thodoxy of Justice Pitney's realization doctrine has been diluted by a reform
movement which concedes the possibility that taxable income can arise
without being severed from capital, labor, or a combination of both. The two
cases most frequently cited as examples of this reformation are Helvering v.
Bruun 9o and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.91
Bruun involved the taxability to a lessor of improvements made by the
lessee. The lessee had erected a new building upon the leased premises in
1929. In 1933, he defaulted on the lease and it was cancelled. Pursuant to
the terms of the lease, the improvement erected by the tenant became the
lessor's property. The Commissioner asserted that the value of the im-
provements as stipulated by the parties constituted taxable income to the
lessor in 1933, the year in which the lease was forfeited. The lessor argued
that a nonseverable improvement to real property had no separate and dis-
tinct value apart from the realty; therefore, the value of the improvement
could not be realized as taxable gain until the.disposition of the entire prop-
erty.
The ruling in Bruun that the value of the improvement was taxable upon
the forfeiture of the lease in 1933 does limit the role of Justice Pitney's
definition of income to an expression of the distinction between a cash or
property dividend (a distribution of corporate profits) and a stock dividend
(which is not a distribution of corporate profits). However, the Bruun court
did not abandon the realization or derivation requirement. It specifically
noted that although
economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled that the
realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an
asset. Gain may occur as a result of exchange of property, payment
of the taxpayer's indebtedness, relief from a liability, or other
profit realized from the completion of a transaction. 92
While this language expanded the category of realization-by-exchange trans-
actions beyond those involving a sale for cash, it did not eliminate the re-
quirement of a realization transaction. The Court merely concluded that the
repossession of a newly improved demised premises constituted an
exchange-type realization transaction, despite the lack of complete sever-
ance:
It is not necessary to the recognition of taxable gain that [the les-
sor] should be able to sever the improvement begetting the gain
89. See note 10 supra.
90. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
91. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
92. 309 U.S. at 469.
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from his original capital. If that were necessary, no income could
arise from the exchange of property; whereas such gain has always
been recognized as realized taxable gain. 93
Clearly, the Court was referring to a physical severance of the improvement;
to read this last statement as an elimination of the realization requirement is
to do violence to the language of the opinion. Even if this statement can be
read to eliminate the need to "sever" gain from the original investment, it
would not apply to the corporation-shareholder relationship where Bruun
apparently concedes that the realization requirement continues to apply.
Bruun says nothing about the corporation-shareholder relationship as such.
Moreover, the Court's recognition that "economic gain is not always taxable
as income" is a clear statement that the Court is not adopting an economic
definition of income which would permit all economic gain, whether realized
or not, to be included in the tax base. 9
4
Glenshaw Glass similarly disclaims adherence to the income definition in
Macomber, but, like Bruun, it does not do away with the realization re-
quirement. The issue in the case was the taxability of windfall income in the
form of exemplary and punitive damage awards as a result of fraud and anti-
trust violations. The taxpayer argued for a restrictive reading of section 22(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (the predecessor of the present section
61) which defined income to include "gains or profits ... derived from any
source whatever." The taxpayer also cited the income definition of
Macomber to support the nontaxability of windfall income. The Court found
that exemplary and punitive damages were taxable and stated that, while the
Macomber definition was useful in distinguishing gain from capital, "it was
not meant to provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions." 95
The following language from Glenshaw Glass is perhaps the most important:
"Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized
and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion."9 r6
In assessing the impact of the foregoing cases, several distinctions must
be noted. First, Bruun and Glenshaw Glass dealt with realization by ex-
change. Hence, their significance in the corporation-shareholder context is
strongest where there is an event constituting a shifting of shareholder
rights-some set of circumstances that can be called an exchange. Their im-
port is weakest where there is no distribution and no other change in
shareholder rights, not even of the minor type connected with a stock div-
idend. But if Bruun and Glenshaw Glass have meaning for the nondistribu-
93. Id.
94. "While it is true that economic gain is not always taxable as income, it is settled that the
realization of gain need not be in cash derived from the sale of an asset." Id.
95. 348 U.S. at 431.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion, no-rights-shifting situation, they cut more strongly in favor of permit-
ting an economic income system of integration (of the sort described in topic
IV. A.) than a system that would measure shareholder income simply by the
amount of firm earnings and tax the shareholder on his pro rata share
thereof. Bruun and Glenshaw Glass emphasize the importance of dominion
and control over increments to wealth. In the nondistribution situation, an
economic income system includes in the individual's tax calculation only a
portion of the income-period increase or decrease in the capitalized-future-
return net worth of the corporation. This amount (if positive) is an increment
to the wealth over which the shareholder has dominion and control, espe-
cially if the shareholder's portion of the increase in corporate net worth is
measured by the income-period change in the value of the shares which he
owns.
By contrast, a system that would tax a shareholder on undistributed earn-
ings is one that attributes to the shareholder an amount by which the
shareholder may not have been enriched. (If there is a corporate earnings
deficit, the shareholder gets a deduction for an amount by which he may not
have been made poorer.) A corporation may have income-period earnings
and, though the earnings are retained, suffer a decrease in its capitalized-
future-return net worth for the same period. Under these conditions, the
proprietorship sector of the firm has not experienced any increase; indeed, it
has become worse off over the income period. Looking at the other side of
the coin, we say that the firm aspect of the shareholders' wealth has not
been enhanced; it has shrunk. Moreover, a shareholder has virtually no
dominion and control over a dollar value attributed to him by reference to
corporate earnings, when that amount is not matched by an increase in the
value of the shares that he owns.
The import of the two preceding paragraphs is really implicit in the
portfolio and capital market theory debate mentioned earlier. That discussion
yields the conclusion that, distributions aside, a shareholder continuously
captures, through his stock ownership, not the dollar amount of current
earnings of the corporation, as such, but rather changes in the present dis-
counted value of a stream of future returns. This present discounted value is
a function of the expected amounts of those returns, their timing, the rate of
interest demanded for riskless securities, the premium return demanded for
the risk or uncertainty connected with returns, and the characteristics (in-
cluding imperfections) of the market in which the security is bought or sold.
Proponents of integration of the simple imputation-of-earnings type will
undoubtedly argue that Congress is no longer bound by the Macomber view
of the corporation-shareholder relation, as evidenced by its straight
imputation-of-earnings treatment of certain corporations and shareholders.
Perhaps the most dramatic example of this congressional departure from the
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established scheme of corporation-shareholder'taxation is Subpart F of the
Internal Revenue Code, 97 which deals with the income of controlled foreign
corporations.
Subpart F was enacted in 196298 as part of the Kennedy administration's
attempt to deal with the rapidly increasing outflow of capital from the
United States. More specifically, Subpart F was designed to deal with the
deferral of taxes by domestic corporations operating abroad through con-
trolled foreign subsidiaries. Under established jurisdictional principles, the in-
come of a foreign subsidiary of a domestic parent could not be subjected to
United States corporate income tax. Under the same principles, those
foreign subsidiaries, by engaging in sales and service activity in a country
vhich did not tax corporate income, could avoid the corporate tax in the
country of their incorporation. 99 Consequently, the income from foreign
operations, when conducted through a foreign subsidiary, could be sheltered
from United States corporate income tax until it was "repatriated" in the
form of distributions to the domestic shareholder (usually a domestic corpo-
ration). Subpart F attacked this deferral device by attributing to certain
United States shareholders their pro rata share of the earnings and profits of
the controlled foreign subsidiary derived from certain activities.' 00 The ac-
tivities Ni'hich give rise to "Subpart F income" are (a) the purchase or sale of
personal property manufactured outside the country of the subsidiary's in-
corporation, where a "related party," usually the parent corporation, is at
either the selling or buying end of the transaction; 1 01 and (b) the rendering
of services abroad by the subsidiary on behalf of a related party, where the
services are not rendered in the country of incorporation.10 2 Income which
qualifies as "personal holding company income" under section 543 of the
Internal Revenue Code will also be treated as Subpart F income.10 3
It appears that the purpose of Subpart F, the attribution of corporate
income to the shareholder, represents a congressional departure from the
realization principles of Macomber. However, the Supreme Court has not
been called upon to test the constitutionality of Subpart F, and given
Macomber, its constitutionality must be regarded as open to question. It has
been suggested that, in view of the possible continuing vitality of Macomber,
the constitutionality of attribution of Subpart F income to shareholders is so
97. I.R.C. §§ 951-64.
98. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87--834, 76 Stat. 960.
99. See discussion in B. BITTKER & L. EBB, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INCOME AND FOREIGN PERSONs 279 (2d ed. 1968).
100. I.R.C. § 951(a).
101. Id. § 954.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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highly questionable that the provisions may be unsupportable. 10 4 That,
perhaps, is the very least that can be said. One could go farther and suggest
that because Subpart F ignores the realization requirement, it is clearly un-
constitutional. One writer, John W. Dowdle, Jr., has flatly concluded that
Subpart F is unconstitutional on the basis of Macomber.10 5  In support of
his contention, Mr. Dowdle cited the Supreme Court's refusal to overrule
Macomber despite the specific request of the Department of Justice to do so
in Glenshaw Glass. ' 0 6 Mr. Dowdle correctly pointed out that, while the
Court appears to have abandoned the Macomber definition of income as a
touchstone to all further gross income questions, it nevertheless found that
the definition serves a useful purpose in distinguishing gain from capital.
Thus, as late as 1955, the Court had not changed its mind about Macomber,
at least insofar as that decision applies to the corporation-shareholder rela-
tionship for tax purposes. 10 7
If, in fact, there are serious doubts as to the constitutionality of Subpart
F, then why has no taxpayer seen fit to contest its provisions? There is no
clear answer to this question, but one might draw a distinction between
domestic corporations which are subject to the corporate income tax and
foreign corporations which are not, even though they are controlled by
United States shareholders. In the latter pase, the controlled foreign corpo-
ration is being used by the United States shareholder as an avoidance de-
vice. In such situations, it is possible that Congress' plenary power to pro-
tect the revenue is sufficient to overcome constitutional objections to the tax.
A similar argument was advanced by congressional proponents of section 334
of the Revenue Act of 1937,108 which provided for the inclusion of the undis-
tributed income of foreign personal holming companies in the gross income
of United States shareholders. 10 9 Presumably, the same argument would
apply to Subpart F. Moreover, the use of controlled foreign corporations to
104. See Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1961). See also Harwich, The Constitutionality of
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, 19 U. MLAIi L. REv. 400, 405-06 (1965).
105. Dowdle, Can Domestic Shareholders Be Taxed on Foreign Corporate Earnings Prior to
Distribution?, 40 TAXES 436 (1962).
106. Id. at 445.
107. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). See also Dowdle, supra
note 105, at 445.
108. Ch. 815, § 334, 50 Stat. 820.
109. In the words of one Congressman:
The philosophy in regard to foreign personal holding companies is based upon the
inherent power in the Government to protect itself from devices to avoid and evade
its law .... We feel certain that the jurisdiction over American taxpayers and in-
come to our citizens, together with the power to protect our revenues are ample
legal support for our position.
81 CONG. REc. 9035 (1937) (remarks of Rep. Vinson). It is interesting that Congress did not
adopt this approach in dealing with the undistributed income of domestic personal holding
companies.
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avoid the corporate income tax and to defer repatriation of foreign source
income does not add to the litigation appeal of such cases. 110 Whatever the
situation with respect to Subpart F, it is clear that no "protection of the
revenue" argument can be made with respect to domestic corporations.
Subpart F may also represent a situation where the earnings of a con-
trolled corporation are to be treated as essentially "distributed" to the con-
trolling corporation, because the latter has broad dominion and control over
them. Of course, if Macomber and subsequent Supreme Court cases sanc-
tion the constitutionality of Subpart F on such a dominion-ergo-distribution
rationale, they might also support a straight imputation-of-earnings type in-
tegration scheme with respect to corporations that are closely controlled by
individuals. From an economic income point of view, however, the amount
of a distribution should not be the end of the calculation of how much in-
come a shareholder experiences. The shareholder should also be able to rec-
ognize, as an element of individual income, his share of the firm's
capitalized-future-return change of net worth during the income period. This
observation isolates the inconsistency between the economic concept of in-
come and the Macomber dictum regarding the manner in which corporate
distributions enter an individual's income picture. This point is as important
as the comparisons that we have drawn between Macomber and the
economic notions of income in the nondistributional context.
But those who cite existing, unchallenged imputation-of-earnings systems
of taxation as evidence that Macomber is a dead letter have a more powerful
argument than Subpart F. They can point to an instance of earnings imputa-
tion where it is well-nigh impossible to find enough control to establish a
distributional equivalent. Limited partners, who are prohibited from exercis-
ing day-to-day managerial authority, and whose dominion and control over
partnership earnings is no greater-perhaps even less-than that of a
shareholder in a publicly held corporation, are taxed on their pro rata shares
of undistributed firm earnings, except where the partnership is taxed as a
corporation. Paradoxically, one of the factors that increases the risk of corpo-
rate tax treatment may be the granting of more than nominal control to
limited partners."' There is a dryly conceptual response to the assertion
that this instance of earnings imputation is conclusive evidence that every
vestige of Macomber must have expired. The retort is simply this:
Macomber said that corporations are entities and partnerships are not; there-
110. Another likely reason for the dearth of litigation is that, prior to the thorough amend-
ment of Subpart F by the Revenue Act of 1975 and the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there were so
many exceptions to the application of the law that a controlled foreign subsidiary could easily
find a statutory safe haven which would prevent the imputation of corporate earnings to U.S.
stockholders. Needless to say, this would make it unnecessary to attack Subpart F on constitu-
tional grounds.
111. See authorities cited in note 55 supra.
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fore it is cricket to impute undistributed earnings to limited partners, while
the same tax approach to corporations is constitutionally off limits. Unfortu-
nately, the entity distinction between corporations and limited
partnerships-comparing shareholders with limited partners-is arrant
petitio principii. The entity description of corporations is a metaphor which
depicts a corporation as a "person," separate and distinct from its owners,
only because the business association law ground rules for operating a firm
in the corporate form create a separation between the asset pool of the cor-
poration and its shareholders for particular purposes. When we see a block
of assets operated in a single name, with operational liability to third parties
running only from that asset pool (and not from individuals), and with
shareholders not handling the day-to-day conduct of affairs, we tend to call
the phenomenon a "person," but the term is just a shorthand for the specific
characteristics that prompted us to use it in the first place. We do not say
that the phenomenon is a person in the complete sense of an individual.
What is more important for present purposes, the very attributes of separa-
tion that lead us to depict "corporateness" as a sort of ectoplasmic generator
of a "person," distinct from shareholders, should lead us just as easily-
perhaps even more easily, because limited partners' supervisory rights are
more attenuated-to predicate the same separateness between limited
partners and the partnership. The situations of limited partners and
shareholders of a publicly held corporation appear to be very much alike as
far as "severance" and "dominion" are concerned.
Thus, there may be considerable force in the argument that the con-
tinued survival of our system of taxing limited partners means that
Macomber has gone the way of the dodo. But a critical element in the ar-
gument is the absence of constitutional challenge to the limited partnership
tax system. There may be some fairly strong practical reasons why imputa-
tion of the undistributed earnings and losses of limited partnerships has not
been attacked in the Supreme Court; by and large, limited partners want
the pass-through of partnership tax attributes. If such an attack were
mounted, however, the fundamentally identical positions of shareholders and
limited partners might bring the Court out swinging. The "severance" and
"dominion" tests lie in solution, ready to be precipitated when the proper
catalyst is supplied. It might be the ultimate irony-and yet perfectly
plausible-for a limited partner to argue that he cannot be constitutionally
taxed on his share of undistributed firm earnings, because of the lack of
severance and dominion, while at the same time his partnership argues that
it cannot be taxed as a corporation under the tests of the Commissioner's
own regulations! 112
112. "An organization will be treated as an association [taxable as a corporation] if the corpo-
rate characteristics are such that the organization more nearly resembles a corporation than a
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In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 113
a case involving the issue of whether the unrealized appreciation of a corpo-
rate taxpayer's portfolio securities could somehow justify the imposition Qf
the penalty tax on the unreasonable accumulation of earnings. The Court
held that unrealized appreciation does have an important bearing on
whether the corporate taxpayer intended to accumulate earnings beyond its
reasonable needs, but the Court clearly distinguished the issue of the
reasonableness of accumulations from the question of the penalty tax base.
In no uncertain terms, the Court repeated the prohibition against including
unrealized appreciation in "income. '114 Though the case involved un-
realized appreciation at the corporate level only, and did not involve a dis-
cussion of interlevel relationships between corporation and shareholder, the
categorical tone of its statements cannot be ignored. The tenor is reminis-
cent of the broad language of Macomber, suggesting that economic gain, of
whatever sort, is not income unless severed by distribution or exchange.
Ivan Allen may well be a signal that Macomber continues to spell trouble for
either a straight imputation-of-earnings or an economic income system of
including, absent a distribution, some corporate-source factor in the indi-
vidual shareholder's income base.
C. Specifying the Implications of Macor-ber
It would be unfair and inaccurate to dismiss Macomber as a relic of yes-
teryear, based simply upon an outworn and arbitrary view of the nature of
the corporation. Though it may, in its broadest reading, be plainly out of
line with the economic view of the corporation, the oFinion nevertheless, in
partnership or trust." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1976). See also authorities cited in note 55
supra.
113. 422 U.S. 617 (1975).
114. The Court made the following statements:
What is essential is that there be "income" and "earnings and profits." This at once
eliminates, from the 'measure of the tax itself, any unrealized appreciation in the
value of the tax'payer's portfolio securities over cost, for any such unrealized ap-
preciation does not enter into the computation of the corporation's "income" and
"earnings and profits."
422 U.S. at 627. And again:
The taxpayer, of course, quite correctly insists that unrealized appreciation of
portfolio securities does not enter into "earnings and profits," . . . As noted above,
we agree.... The question is not whether unrealized appreciation enters into the
determination of earnings and profits, which it does not ....
422 U.S. at 632-33. The Court also cited, without any hint of criticism, a prior Second Circuit
case which had indicated that an attempt to tax shareholders on undistributed unreasonable
accumulations would be unconstitutional. 422 U.S. at 625 n.8. The Court described Macomber
as a case which "emphasizes the realization of income with respect to a tax on a shareholder."
422 U.S. at 634.
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its narrowest reading, states a defensible position. We tend to forget that the
Court had experienced some difficulty with the constitutionality of the in-
come tax prior to the adoption of the sixteenth amendment. The origin of
that difficulty lay in article I, section 9, clause 4 and article I, section 2,
clause 3 of the Constitution, which require that any direct tax must be ap-
portioned among the states in accordance with the census enumeration. In a
pre-sixteenth amendment case, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 1 5
the Court had determined that a tax on the income from property was a
direct tax on the property itself and hence unconstitutional if not appor-
tioned according to the population in the several states. The adoption of the
sixteenth amendment cleared the way for the taxation of income from prop-
erty. The Court was left, however, with the difficult task of distinguishing
between income and capital, since any attempt to tax capital would violate
the constitutional provision.
Given this background, and lacking any systematic concept of economic
income, the Court hit upon the idea of "severance" as a means of distin-
guishing capital from income. The Court was willing to concede that ap-
preciation in the value of property was a form of economic gain, but it could
not concede that all economic gains were income. Such gains became in-
come only when severed from the underlying capital. Justice Pitney sum-
marized the distinction: "IT]he Amendment applies to income only, and
what is called the stockholder's share in the accumulated profits of the com-
pany is capital, not income." 11 6 The concept of severance became the in-
strument which enabled the Court to distinguish between income, on which
a direct tax was permissible without apportionment, and capital, on which a
direct tax was permissible only if apportioned. Therefore, *the discussion of
the nature of the corporation-shareholder relationship in Macomber is sec-
ondary to Justice Pitney's statement of how severance affects the characteri-
zation of undistributed corporate profits.
It is not difficult to find fault with the Macomber opinion. The word
"derived" need not have been contorted in order to equate it with the idea
of severance. The word can mean "traced from" or "developed from" as
easily as it can mean "severed from." 117 Had it been so defined, the idea of
severance would not have lured the Court into a constitutional comer from
which it cannot easily extricate itself.
115. 157 U.S. 429, aff'd on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
116. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920).
117. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 705 (2d unabr. ed. 1958). The
definition of the word "derive" is "to trace the origin." Nowhere is it suggested that something
must be severed from the source or origin to be "derived." It is also interesting to note that, in
groping for a definition of income, the Court deliberately avoided economic definitions and
specifically opted for the "common speech" definition. 252 U.S. at 206-07. After citing several
common reference dictionaries, the Court determined that those sources had nothing of value to
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If confronted with a nondistribution case today, the Court might concede
that the appreciation in the value of corporate stock, computed on a
capitalization-of-future-returns basis, is an accession to wealth and hence tax-
able as income to the shareholder because such appreciation is subject to his
dominion and control. The Court might be influenced by the economic de-
finition of income and could say that (1) since the appreciation in corporate
stock values can be easily realized by a sale of all of the stock, and (2) since
this realization can be accomplished by a mere ministerial act (calling one's
broker), then the appreciation should be considered as an accession to
wealth under the dominion and control of the shareholder. At the same
time, the Court might adopt the views of Richard B. Goode, for example,
and conclude that, in a large modem corporation, the shareholder is- so re-
moved from the seat of corporate power that it is unrealistic to think of
corporate earnings as being within his dominion and control.118
Macomber continues to cast a long shadow, however. It is difficult to
escape the impact of Justice Pitney's plain statement that a stockholder's
share of accumulated corporate earnings is capital, not income, and therefore
not taxable under the sixteenth amendment. That difficulty is not amelior-
ated by taxing the appreciated value of the securities on an economic income
rationale. When Justice Pitney held that not all economic gains were in-
come, he placed a severe limitation on congressional freedom to deal freely
with the income concept. In concrete terms, he may have ruled out that
portion of the Haig-Simons definition of income which treats unrealized in-
creases in net worth as income.
No matter how the Court deals with the specific definitional problem of
the sixteenth amendment, it will not readily relinquish its obligation to in-
terpret article I, section 2, clause 3, and article I, section 9, clause 4, and
the sixteenth amendment. The Court will continue to search for some con-
cept which will enable it to differentiate between capital and income.11 9
add to the definition of income as "gain derived from capital, from labor, or. from both com-
bined" which had been adopted in the Corporate Tax Act of 1909. What is strange, however, is
that, in turning to the sermo cotidianus for a definition of income, the Court did not also look to
the common parlance or dictionary definition of the word "derived," but chose instead to
employ its own unusual meaning.
118. R. GOODE, supra note 74, at 186-87.
119. Justice Pitney felt rather strongly that it was the Court's duty to protect the integrity of
article I, section 9, clause 4, which calls for apportionment of direct taxes according to the
population. He therefore called for a strict construction of the sixteenth amendment:
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language, requires also
that this Amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or
modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that re-
quire an apportionment according to population for direct taxes u'pon property, real
and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and is
not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the courts.
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (emphasis added).
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Before critiquing proposed corporation-shareholder tax systems according
to their conformity with constitutional and economic income principles, we
shall recapitulate our conclusions with respect to the Macomber line of au-
thority and its compatibility with economic income concepts. We believe
that Macomber is susceptible of three principal readings, two dealing with
income in the nondistribution context, and a third relating to distributions.
We submit them as follows:
1. Narrow holding-no distribution. Absent a distribution, the
income of individuals may not include a pro rata share of
undistributed earnings, as such. Undistributed earnings do not, per
se,. measure the amount by which a shareholder is richer, and, in a
widely held corporation, the shareholder has no control over them.
This holding is consonant with economic income concepts, and, if
economic income is to be the tax base, this version of Macomber
should not be overruled. This narrow reading might admit of a
corporation-shareholder tax system that would, under nondistribu-
tion conditions, cause the capitalized-future-return net worth
changes of the firm to be reflected in the income of individuals.
These fluctuations represent accessions to the wealth of individuals
over which they have dominion and control.
If dominion and control become the prime tests, Macomber, as
expanded, might also be read to permit an imputation of firm earn-
ings to shareholders in a closely controlled corporation situa-
tion. 1 20 This approach, which treats the corporate earnings as es-
sentially distributed, is at odds with economic income concepts,
because a share of earnings may be more or less than the amount
by which the shareholder is enriched. If economic income is the
desired tax base, the dominion-ergo-distribution constitutional in-
terpretation should not be adopted.
2. Broad holding-no distribution. The sweeping language of
the Macomber Court might preclude an economic income approach
which would allow fluctuations in the firm's capitalized-future-
return net worth to be reflected in individual income. The likeli-
hood of this constitutional result seems enhanced by the robust
language of Ivan Allen. If economic income is the normatively pre-
ferred tax base, this broad interpretation of Macomber must be
avoided, or, if it cannot be avoided, Macomber must be overruled
pro tanto.
3. Dictum regarding distributions. Macomber may be read to
legitimize the inclusion of cash or property distributions, as such,
in the income of shareholder recipients, without any adjustment for
120. See, e.g., General Revenue Revision: Hearings on H.R. 1275 Before the House Comm.
on Ways & Means, 83 Cong., 1st Sess. 454 (1953) (proposal of Rep. Multer). No doubt, any
such scheme would encounter administrative and practical problems unrelated to Macomber.
See statement of Mr. Antoine, id. at 560, 562. See also the discussion of Subpart F in topic IV.
B. supra.
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income-period changes in the capitalized-future-return net worth of
the distributing firm. This approach is repugnant to economic in-
come concepts because the economic income of the firm, and
hence the economic income of individuals, may be more or less
than the dollar amount of the distribution.
V. INTEGRATION AND ITS INFINITE VARIETY:
THE PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS
There is little chance that an integration scheme which calls for total
abolition of the corporate income tax and the direct imputation of corporate
earnings to shareholders can be adopted in the United States, except,
perhaps, where a corporation is closely held. Such a scheme would require a
major upheaval in the constitutional meaning of income, a rejection of the
narrow holding of Macomber, and the abandonment of the dominion and
control doctrine, which is simply not likely to happen. There are several
other integration schemes, however. Each of the major ones should be
examined to see how it might fit into the framework of the Macomber impli-
cations, and how it squares with economic income concepts.
One possible variation of the integration scheme which is proposed by
some authorities is the present Canadian system of the "grossed-up" div-
idend. Under this system, the corporation continues to pay tax on its income
at a relatively high rate (46% in Canada). The shareholder is then required
to include in his income the entire amount of dividends received plus one-
third of that aggregate amount (called the "grossed-up dividend"). The
shareholder then receives a credit against his tax of approximately one-third
of the actual dividend.' 2 ' An example will illustrate the operation of the
grossed-up dividend credit. Assume that a Canadian shareholder in the 40%
tax bracket receives a dividend of $300 from a Canadian corporation. His
grossed-up dividend is $400 (actual dividend of $300 plus one-third). The tax
at 40% on $400 is $160. A credit of 20% of the grossed-up dividend of $400
(or 80% of $100) is then subtracted from the tax of $160, so that the net tax
payable by the shareholder will be $80.122
While this system is only an intermediate approach to full integration, it
is nevertheless grounded upon the rationale that a corporation is essentially
an aggregate of its shareholders and that the corporate tax is merely an ad-
vance payment of the shareholders' tax. An analysis of the example indicates
that a portion of pretax corporate earnings is imputed to the shareholder
121. H. STIKEMAN, INCOME TAX ACT, ANNOTATED §§ 82(1), 121 (6th Tax Reform ed. 1975-
76).
122. This calculation is somewhat imprecise because it does not take into account provincial
taxes, which are added after the application of the credit. The combined dominion and provin-
cial tax is actually reduced by approximately the amount of the gross-up.
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who pays tax upon it at his regular marginal rate. The taxpayer then receives
a credit for a portion of the corporate tax attributable to the income distrib-
uted to him, thus alleviating the double tax burden which would otherwise
apply. By contrast, in a full imputation system using the grossed-up dividend
approach, the shareholder would be taxed, at his marginal rate, on the
amount of corporate earnings needed to produce, after corporate-level taxes,
the amount of the dividend. He would similarly receive a credit for the
corporate tax on the gross amount of earnings needed to produce, after
corporate-level taxes, the amount of the dividend. Depending upon the cor-
poration's tax rate and the shareholder's individual marginal tax rate, this
system of imputation would produce either a refund or an additional tax.
Canada has obviously gone less than half way to the full imputation sys-
tem. 1
23
While even the narrow holding of Macomber stands, it is doubtful that
the Canadian scheme could be adopted in the United States, except possibly
for closely held corporations. The scheme still assumes the economic unity of
shareholders and corporations and imputes corporate earnings, as contrasted
with economic income, to the shareholder. The fact that the Canadian sys-
tem imputes only some corporate income to the shareholder does not cure
the basic constitutional limitation imposed by Macomber.
Another integration scheme, the "split-rate" system, was adopted in
West Germany in 1953. Under this scheme, the corporation pays a high rate
of tax (51%) on its undistributed earnings and a much lower rate (15%) on its
distributed earnings. Integration is thus achieved at the corporate level by
the virtual elimination of the tax on distributed earnings. 12 4
The German split-rate scheme is similar to the system we employed dur-
ing 1937-1939, in which integration at the corporate level was achieved by
allowing a deduction for dividends paid. The Scandinavian countries of Fin-
land and Norway use this approach. In Finland, for example, the corporation
is permitted to deduct 40% of dividends paid. In Norway, the corporation is
permitted to deduct 100% of dividends paid. In both countries, the corpora-
tion continues to pay tax at the applicable corporate rate on its undistributed
income, while the shareholder pays tax at his normal marginal rate on the
dividends received. No credit or imputation is required.125
123. The Carter Commission did, in fact, propose a full imputation system using a grossed-up
dividend approach. See 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commis-
sion Report), ch. 19, at 83 (1966). Under the system proposed by the Carter Commission, a
resident shareholder would receive a credit against his personal tax on account of corporate
income tax paid in respect of after-tax corporate earnings paid or imputed to him. If the credit
exceeded his tax liability, he would receive a refund.
124. These provisions are discussed in BOARtD OF INLAND REVENUE, 3 INCOME TAXES OUT-
SIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM 58-59 (1975) (U.K.) [hereinafter cited as INLAND REVENUE].
125. Income & Capital Tax Law, Law of Nov. 19, 1943, No. 88, as amended, Law of June 24,
1968, Nos. 360-62 (Fin.), discussed in 3 INLAND REVENUE, supra note 124, at 58-59; Com-
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Aside from the compulsion toward distribution associated with the
dividends-paid or split-rate systems, practical differences between the credit
system and the split-rate or dividends-paid deduction system are insignifi-
cant. So long as the corporation maintains a proper distribution schedule
under the split-rate or dividends-paid deduction regime, both systems ac-
complish partial integration by subjecting some portion of corporate earnings
(namely, distributions) to individual ordinary income rates only. The choice
between the credit system and the split-rate or dividends-paid deduction
system is often made primarily on the basis of the effect of the choice on the
taxation of nonresident shareholders. Where integration is accomplished by
either the split-rate or the dividends-paid deduction system, the corporation
pays a lower tax regardless of the place of residence, nationality, or domicile
of its shareholders. Such a feature is important, since in some countries the
ubiquity of foreign shareholders, mainly United States citizens, has begun to
offend the country of incorporation. A credit or imputation system of integra-
tion can discriminate against foreign shareholders by simply disallowing the
credit to nonresidents. On the other hand, the split-rate and the deduction
systems may actually favor nonresident shareholders who are not subject to
the host country's graduated income tax, or who, by treaty arrangements,
are excused from a substantial amount of that country's withholding taxes on
dividends. In Canada, for example, the Carter Commission regarded the
idea of permitting a dividend deduction as reasonable. However, the Com-
mission chose not to recommend corporate level integration precisely be-
cause it would enrich foreign shareholders at the expense of Canadian tax
revenues. 126  This objection to corporate level integration is not especially
persuasive in our own situation. The United States is not, as yet, over-
whelmed by foreign investors who can escape the individual tax rates by
virtue of tax treaty arrangements.
Integration by way of the dividends-paid deduction at the corporate
level, with only distributions being included in shareholder income, offers a
workable compromise with Macomber. A deduction at the corporate level for
dividends paid does no violence to the Macomber concept of the separate
status of corporations and shareholders. In theory, such an approach faces up
to the economic logic that follows from the adoption of a separate entity
concept. It recognizes, in a partial way, that a shareholder is a provider of
capital who expects payment for the use of that capital. Unlike the present
munal Income Tax Law of Aug. 18, 1911, as amended, Law of June 19, 1969 (Nor.), discussed
in 6 INLAND REVENUE, supra note 105, at 119-20.
126. See 4 REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission Report), ch.
19, at 44-45 (1966).
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system, whereby interest on corporate indebtedness is deductible but div-
idends on equity capital are not, amounts paid for the use of all capital
would receive more nearly equal treatment.
Throughout this article, we have sought to show that abolition of the
corporate level tax can be justified by an analysis of the relationship between
firm economic income and individual economic income. We have suggested
that all firm economic income is fully included in the totality of individual
economic income. Our focus, therefore, has been on the intimacy between
the corporation and its shareholders, with the economic income concept
serving as the bond between them. Here we digress to demonstrate how,
even if the separate taxpayer status of a corporation must be taken as a
given, economic reasoning would still yield the conclusion that the corpora-
tion should pay no tax. Our present system of taxation generally recognizes
the principle that a firm taxpayer (i.e., a taxpayer engaged in production)
should be allowed deductions for all economic costs except opportunity
costs. Opportunity costs and pure profits are fundamentally the firm's taxable
income base. An opportunity cost is the normal profit earned on endow-
ments owned by the taxpayer. The price paid for capital not owned by the
taxpayer is a cost other than an opportunity cost. If we must assume that a
corporation is a taxpaying entity separate and distinct from its shareholders,
it follows that all payments made for the use of capital, debt or equity, are
costs other than opportunity costs, since the corporation has no endowment
of its own. And the dollar cost of corporate equity is the entire operational
return (distributed or not) attributable to equity. Therefore, all receipts of
the corporation are offset by nonopportunity costs, and, by today's tests,
there is no taxable income. The argument does not offer the more satisfy-
ingly comprehensive view of firm and firm-owner wealth-change relation-
ships developed earlier, but, if we are forced (say, by the Supreme Court) to
accept the separate taxpayer status of corporations, the conclusion that cor-
porations ever have normal profits, let alone pure profits, is economically
puzzling. The dividends-paid deduction and the split-rate systems forth-
rightly, albeit only partially, alleviate the puzzlement.
Similar treatment for the cost of debt and equity capital could, of course,
be achieved by disallowing a deduction for the cost of either one and not
necessarily by allowing a deduction for both. Professor Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
has suggested that doing away with the interest deduction is the only real
alternative: A deduction for dividend payments is, in his view, simply not
politically feasible and is therefore too remote a possibility to merit serious
consideration.' 2 7 Suggestions for integration of the corporate and individual
127. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YAL.E L.J. 1585,
1609 (1974).
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income taxes would indeed face an uphill battle, but there appears to be
considerable momentum behind such a proposal. It is now being openly and
seriously discussed by Congress as well as by government officials, commen-
tators, and economists.
Since the idea of a deduction for dividends paid is clearly not subject to
the strictures of Macomber, it may provide the most likely vehicle for inte-
gration in this country, particularly since it is unlikely that the Court will
overrule Macomber to make way for an imputation-of-earnings scheme.
For a short period of time between 1937 and 1939, corporations were
permitted to deduct dividend distributions. Although it is not entirely clear
why, this system of partial integration was met with widespread opposition
from corporate management. It appears that directors felt considerable pres-
sure from shareholders to make dividend distributions in order to reduce
corporate taxes and thus increase the return on shareholder investment. If
successful, shareholder pressure for distribution of earnings would have de-
creased the amount of internal funds which were available for investment
and would have fostered greater reliance on capital markets, a result man-
agement preferred to avoid.1 2 8  Clearly, this pressure to distribute would
adversely affect the "growth" company which has traditionally financed its
projects through retained earnings. It would also eliminate the practice of
accumulating simply for the purpose of providing a tax advantage to
shareholders, a course of conduct that results in overcapitalization and
perhaps a shortage of funds for immediate application to capital formation.12 9
The present complex of corporate and individual taxes, including the low
capital gains rate, the deferral of tax on appreciation in value until the sale of
the stock, and the possible escape from tax of pre-1977 gains under section
1014(a) of the Code, 130 favor investment in the low-payout company. If this
complex of advantages is offset by the higher net return on distributions, the
low-payout firm may, as a result of shareholder pressure, be a thing of the
128. See Cohen, Possible Solutions to Practical Problems in Integration of the Corporate and
Shareholder Income Tax, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 359, 362-63 (1975).
129. See paragraph four of note 36 supra.
130. Prior to the amendment of section 1014(a) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, the basis of property acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance from a
decedent was the fair market value at the date of death. Thus, any appreciation in value from
decedents date of acquisition to decedents date of death was never subjected to income taxa-
tion. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 provides a so-called "fresh start" provision. For purposes of
determining gain, section 1023(h) now provides that, with respect to property acquired from a
decedent who died after December 31, 1976, the basis shall be the higher of the actual cost to
the decedent or the fair market value of the property on December 31, 1976. Pub. L. No.
94-455, § 317, 90 Stat. 1520. The step-up in basis applies only to property acquired through a
decedent who owned the property on December 31, 1976, or from a trust which held the
property on that date.
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past, but there will be gains in economic neutrality' 3 1 and tax equity.' 32
Offsetting these gains are the transaction costs that must be incurred by a
corporation that would, absent tax motivations, accumulate earnings for new
internal operating projects. Such a firm must distribute and then engage in a
costly fund-raising effort. 133
Thus far we have mentioned schemes that will achieve only partial inte-
gration. Full integration means that all corporate-source income is taxed only
once to individual shareholders at their marginal bracket rates for ordinary
income. The credit (gross-up), split-rate, and dividends-paid deduction for-
mats provide only partial integration, because they achieve the integrative
objective only with respect to distributed corporate-source earnings. This is
so because, in all three schemes, a cash or property dividend is a necessary
step in the mechanical accomplishment of integration. Full integration
(reaching all corporate-source income, and not just distributions) is sought by
those who see greater allocative efficiency and equity in every additional
move toward the ultimate. The typical proposal for full integration calls for
imputation of undistributed earnings to shareholders. This system, of course,
runs most squarely afoul of Macomber, except, perhaps, in the context of a
closely held corporation.
Measured by economic income criteria, none of the systems mentioned
in this section passes muster. None seeks to assure that only the economic
income of a firm enters the tax base. The partial integration schemes tax
distributions to individuals without any adjustment for changes in the
capitalized-future-return net worth of the firm,134 and the income signifi-
cance of a distribution may well be gauged somehow by current or prior
retained earnings. 135 Moreover, the partial integration schemes tax, at the
corporate level, undistributed current earnings as such, instead of looking
131. See discussion in topic III. A. supra. Neutrality would be furthered on four fronts:
(1) allocation of wealth between consumption and saving, see note 29, fifth paragraph, and text
accompanying note 35 supra; (2) allocation of the capital factor between corporate and noncor-
porate production, see text accompanying notes 31-34 supra; (3) allocation of wealth between
high risk and low risk real asset projects, see note 29, sixth paragraph, supra and accompanying
text; and (4) allocation of consumption deferral between financial investments that lead to im-
mediate formation of real capital and those that do not, see note 29, third paragraph, and note
36, fourth paragraph, supra.
132. See discussion in topic III. B. supra.
133. Were it not for the repugnance -of its imputation aspect to Macomber, the credit (or
gross-up) system would furnish an acceptable method of achieving greater flexibility on the
timing of distributions. The Carter administration appears to be leaning towards the gross-up
approach. See FoRBES, Aug. 1, 1977, at 21.
134. See pp. 917-18 supra.
135. Id. Some commentators have called for the abandonment of an earnings test for gauging
the income significance of a distribution. See Blum, The Earnings and Profits Limitation on
Dividend Income: A Reappraisal, 53 TAXES 68 (1975). The economic income analytical
framework furnishes a systematic basis for reaching the same result.
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only to changes in the capitalized-future-return net worth of the firm in
order to account for items of income or loss, other than distributions, at-
tributable to the finn. 136
Full integration accomplished by means of an imputation of undistributed
earnings to shareholders also clashes with economic income concepts. Again,
the firm contribution to the economic income base (considered separately or
as an ingredient absorbed in the economic income of individuals) is the
firm's income-period distributions (less income-period injections of new capi-
tal) plus or minus its change in net worth, computed after any distributions
by capitalizing future expected returns. 137
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PROBLEM AREAS
Most tax policy commentary has concentrated on devising partially or
completely integrated 138 systems of corporation-shareholder taxation in order
to achieve economic neutrality and equity.139 In the process, they have not
concentrated on the nature, timing, and amount of firm income, or the sys-
tematic relationship of firm income to individual income. Moreover, the con-
stitutional implications of various systems of integration have taken a back
seat in the discussions. The policy analyses have assumed that the proper
measure of firm income is "earnings," a word that we have used to roughly
describe accounting net income or present day taxable income.' 4 0 Tax sys-
tems contemplating an imputation of undistributed earnings, however, raise
serious constitutional problems.' 4 1
Our principal concern has been the anatomy of the tax base, particularly
the possibility that the firm component of, or contribution to, the tax base
should be the economic income of the firm. 142 By "economic firm income"
we mean income-period distributions (less new capital contributed by
shareholders), plus or minus the income-period increase or decrease in the
net worth of the firm, computed, after distributions, by capitalizing the
firm's future expected returns. Firm economic income could be taxed as
such at the corporate level and ignored at the individual level. But, because
of its systematic relationship to individual economic income, it also shows up
fully in the economic income of individuals. 143 Full integration can thus be
136. See pp. 917-18 supra.
137. See topic IV. A. supra.
138. See topic V. supra. Full integration involves taxing all corporate source income only at
the marginal, ordinary-income bracket rate of the individuals who experience the income.
139. See topic III. supra.
140. See p. 900 supra.
141. See topics IV. B. & C. & V. supra.
142. See topic IV. A. supra.
143. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
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achieved by forgetting the tax at the corporate level and by taxing all indi-
viduals on an economic income basis. Under the narrow reading of
Macomber regarding the nondistribution setting, 144 the economic income
approach to integration, as compared with an earnings imputation system,
may be more in harmony with constitutional doctrine. 1 45
Present and proposed systems of corporation-shareholder taxation are in-
consistent with economic income concepts. 14 6
Finally, it is appropriate to comment on several problem areas connected
with the adoption of an economic income approach to corporation-
shareholder tax systems. These are: (1) the relationship of the firm economic
income aggregate to the National Income Account; (2) the question of
whether the computation of firm economic income in the manner adopted in
this article involves a form of double taxation; and (3) difficulties of valuation
and the effects of market characteristics and imperfections.
First, because economic firm income is computed quite differently from
earnings, the aggregate of firm earnings will not articulate with the National
Income Account, which calculates profits more or less in accordance with
accounting net income principles. 147 Economic income is not a total
stranger to the system of national accounts, however. Though they are more
conceptually primitive and far less widely referred to, the Wealth Account
and Accumulations Account pick up changes in net worth, presumably on a
capitalized-future-return basis in the case of investments. 148
The reason given for not computing the National Income Account so as
to show capitalized-future-return net worth changes is that the account is
meant to reflect "current economic activity." 149 But changes in capitalized-
future-return net worth constitute income-period economic changes, in
terms of what the marketplace expects the future will bring for investment.
We come, then, to one of the normative issues in tax policy: Suppose in-
come, as measured by the National Income Account, has been substantially
offset by capitalized-future-return losses in the value of investments. Should
we determine how much to withdraw from the private sector by reference to
the National Income Account alone, or should we also take cognizance of
capitalized-future-return value changes, which provide predictive economic
information?
144. See p. 934 supra.
145. See discussion in topic IV. B. & C. supra. A possible exception is the case where
shareholders have day-to-day management control. See text accompanying note supra.
146. See p. 918 supra. Even today, A and B in the illustration of footnote 71 could complain
that they should not be taxed fully on their $50 distributions. If the Supreme Court adopted an
economic income approach, A and B would prevail.
147. See, e.g., F. WYKOFF, MACROECONOMICS 33 (1976).
148. Id. at 22-25.
149. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMIcs 201 (9th ed. 1973).
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Second, it may be argued that the computation of economic income has a
double tax aspect about it, because it takes account of the present value of
future returns at the close of period 1, and then includes a period-2 dis-
tribution as income in period 2. It might appear that the period-2 distribu-
tion was included once, anticipatorily, in the tax base of period 1, and that
the amount of the distribution should not be included again in period 2. The
answer lies in the fact that firm economic income for any period, including
period 2, is a combination of distributions and changes in capitalized-future-
return net worth. Hence, there is the possibility that the distribution in
period 2 will be offset by a decrease in the end-of-period-2 net worth of the
firm, reckoned (as it should be) after the distribution. The period-2 distribu-
tion was anticipatorily taxed in period I only if (1) there was a period 1
increase in capitalized-future-return net worth, and (2) the period-2 distribu-
tion was peculiarly responsible for such increase. But if the anticipated in-
clusion of the period-2 distribution in the firm's stream of returns was pecu-
liarly responsible for a period-1 net worth increase, then its deletion from
that stream in period 2 should lead to a compensating downward shift in net
worth at the end of period 2.
Third, there are the inevitable "practicality" criticisms of an economic
income approach to corporation-shareholder taxation. The criticisms relate to
the net worth change calculation involved in the determination of economic
income. They would presumably fall in three major categories: (1) lack of
evidence of capital value, (2) value effects of capital market characteristics
(other than imperfections), and (3) value effects of capital market imperfec-
tions. An investigation of the magnitude of these problems is grist for
another discussion, but, a priori, we see no difficulties that are drastically
different from those that must be faced in various existing federal and state
systems of taxation. Where there is no market for stock, it would be neces-
sary to use the services of experts. As for the value impact of differences in
market characteristics (number of shareholders, number of trades, and
number of shares traded), though these characteristics have independent ef-
fects on value-so that a share whose intrinsic characteristics remain the
same might have a different value depending on the sort of market in which
it is traded-there is no reason to shrink from accepting the valuations pro-
vided by markets of diverse attributes. So far as the taxpayer is concerned,
value is what the market, such as it is, will furnish him for his stock. There
is no "other" value for him. The same goes for imperfections in the market,
such as information failures about the intrinsic qualities of the firm or the
number and terms of offers to buy or sell. Imperfections are with us!
We have not been strongly prescriptive in our analysis of the economic
income approach to corporation-shareholder taxation. Among alternatives,
however, such an approach may best conform to the limits on Congress'
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power of selection. We do not believe that Congress' choice is unrestricted.
The word "income" in the Constitution was meant to identify a permissible
class of unapportioned taxes. It is elementary logic that a term cannot serve
as a constraint on a body that has unfettered power to determine its mean-
ing. If there is flexibility as to what "income" shall mean for corporation-
shareholder taxation, it resides in the Supreme Court. Considering only the
narrow holding of Macomber, the Court has not squarely rejected the
economic income approach; indeed, it is possible to read the cases as
exhibiting a certain sympathy to. the economic income concept. 1 50 The Su-
preme Court, and a fortiori Congres, would do well to study the implica-
tions of economic income insights regarding a firm and its owners.
150. See discussion in topic IV. B. & C. supra.
